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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 1984 offers legal theorists an unusual opportunity to
unify the various strands of the theory of personal jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court actually demanded unification
seven years ago in Shaffer v. Heitner' when it declared that "all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according
to the standards set forth in International Shoe [v. State of Wash-
ington2 ] and its progeny."3 The opportunity to act on this demand,
however, has had to await the coalescing of two features of existing
doctrine. First, the Court's decisions since Shaffer facilitate an at-
tempt to organize personal jurisdiction theory around the rights of
the individual parties without reference to the supposed interests
of forum states or to other states' interests in "sovereignty." Sec-
ond, although the current jurisdictional tests that are geared to in-
dividual rights are somewhat in disarray, their underlying theories
are now readily reconcilable. These tests are expressed in two dis-
tinct lines of decision: a largely coherent body of cases based on
International Shoe's multiple factor concept of "minimum con-
1. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. 433 U.S. at 212.
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tacts,"'4 and a separate decisional strain composed of several "sin-
gle factor" tests that dispense with contacts altogether. Neither
the Court nor scholarly comment has ventured to explain how to
use this patchwork of contacts-based and noncontacts-based tests
to decide whether a particular exercise of jurisdiction is fair.
This Article accepts the challenge to unify personal jurisdic-
tion theory by proposing an approach that accommodates both the
contacts-based and noncontacts-based tests under uniform juris-
dictional standards. The analysis builds on the major assumption,
elaborated in part II, that the Supreme Court's decision in Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee7 re-
moved the principal barrier to a unified theory by ousting govern-
mental interests from their long held place in personal jurisdiction
decisions.8 The principal thesis is that International Shoe has
made two general, lasting contributions to jurisdictional theory.
First, International Shoe recognized, although less clearly than
Ireland, that the goal of due process in personal jurisdiction is to
assure a forum that is fair to the parties, including the plaintiff,
rather than one that furthers forum state interests or vague no-
tions of state sovereignty. Second, International Shoe implicitly
identified two comprehensive standards or criteria-described here
as "expectation" and "benefit"-for measuring a forum's fairness
to the parties. These broad criteria should replace the opinion's
familiar minimum contacts tests as the real "standards" of Inter-
national Shoe that Shaffer prescribed for universal application.
Under this analysis the particularized contacts tests are simply
4. In its most general terms, the concept requires that a defendant not present in a
territory have certain minimum contacts with that forum in order to be subject to its juris-
diction, so that the suit will not "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
5. See Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on
the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273, 276-78. These single factor, non-
contacts bases of jurisdiction include consent, waiver, in-state personal service or "tagging,"
place of incorporation, domicile, determinations of status, jurisdiction by necessity, and a
cluster of other exceptions to the basic contacts framework of International Shoe. Id.
6. See McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35
Vmw. L. REv. 1, 11 (1982).
7. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
8. In this view, Ireland recognized that the sole concern of due process in the personal
jurisdiction setting is to assure a forum that is relatively fair to the parties; consequently,
the only considerations relevant to the jurisdictional decision are those that pertain to the
parties' individual rights. See id. at 702 n.10; Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sover-
eignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58
NoTrE D ma LAw. 699, 722-26 (1983).
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useful, nonexhaustive surrogates for the "expectation" or "benefit"
yardsticks that should be the ultimate measures of fairness to the
parties.
Part II surveys the current contacts-based and noncontacts-
based tests of jurisdiction and describes how those tests serve the
two general fairness standards. The "expectation" standard in-
quires retrospectively whether a reasonable person in the defend-
ant's position should be surprised by having to defend a particular
claim in the plaintiff's chosen forum.9 The "benefit" standard asks
whether, apart from the defendant's expectations, the benefit he
has derived from his forum-related activities justifies requiring him
to defend in the forum any claim-even one wholly unrelated to
those activities 0
Part III proposes four modifications to the existing contacts
tests so that these tests might serve as more reliable indicators of
the determinative criteria of expectation and benefit. The first
modification is explicit recognition of a plaintiff's due process in-
terest in the jurisdictional question. In virtually all cases, however,
the proposed interest is limited to situations in which the plaintiff
would have to bring multiple suits if the forum could not assert
jurisdiction over all of the defendants. The second suggested modi-
fication is assignment of jurisdictional significance to all the de-
fendant's forum contacts, regardless of when he made them. By
concentrating on the defendant's "historical" forum contacts,
classical contacts analysis has failed to take into account the bene-
fits a defendant has reaped after the events giving rise to litigation;
it also has ignored the possible relevance of the defendant's con-
duct after the start of litigation to his expectations about place of
suit. Third, for certain claims against multiple foreign defendants
with similar defenses, contacts analysis should consider whether
each defendant needs to appear to protect his interests. The plain-
tiff may have to fragment his claim if the forum lacks jurisdiction
over any one defendant. To avoid this consequence, the forum
should be able to assert jurisdiction even over defendants with no
forum contacts, if other defendants actually defending in the fo-
rum well represent the absent defendants' interests. Fourth, be-
cause the minimum contacts tests are merely indicators of broader
fairness criteria, courts should be free to exercise jurisdiction based
on a blending of claim-related and nonclaim-related contacts.
9. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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Thus, independently insufficient claim-related and nonclaim-re-
lated contacts, considered together, may warrant jurisdiction under
a more fundamental rationale of expectation or benefit.
In part IV this Article evaluates the constitutional validity of
eleven particularized noncontacts-based tests under this proposed
framework. Only one of these satellite tests clearly is incompatible
with the two fairness criteria. The others gain renewed theoretical
justification from their consistency with the reformulated contacts
tests or with the broader criteria of expectation or benefit.
The most important practical consequence of this Article's
thesis is that courts may treat the established contacts formulae as
widely applicable litmus tests, rather than as essential thresholds
to jurisdiction. Under the proposed approach, International Shoe's
primary significance is that it implicitly posits the overriding crite-
ria of expectation and benefit for assessing the fairness of the fo-
rum to the parties. By contrast, International Shoe's minimum
contacts tests are merely convenient, reasonably objective devices
for ascertaining whether those criteria are met. Courts may assert
jurisdiction despite the absence of the customarily required con-
tacts whenever such assertion is fair in light of the defendant's ex-
pectations, benefits, or both. Correlatively, the noncontacts-based
satellite tests should receive a fuller and franker acceptance; most
of these tests comport with the proposed approach's emphasis on
fairness to the individual parties.
Under any legal standard, the endlessly varied fact patterns of
future cases will raise new questions about jurisdictional fairness
and undoubtedly will generate pressures either for further changes
to the particularized jurisdictional tests or for new tests altogether.
To permit these refinements and additions to evolve within a sta-
ble structure, this Article proposes that expectation and benefit be-
come the exclusive, unvarying, and ultimate criteria for judging not
only the fairness of all particularized tests but also the fairness of
all individual assertions of jurisdiction. These uniform standards
should foster continuity, predictability, and certainty in jurisdic-
tional theory without sacrificing the flexibility necessary to accom-
modate desirable changes in the particularized tests.
II. THE FISSURES IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE SINCE
International Shoe AND AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR
REUNIFICATION
In the sixty-eight years preceding International Shoe, judges
labored to justify their personal jurisdiction decisions within the
19841
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tight theoretical confines of Pennoyer v. Neff."' When faced with
facts that strained Pennoyer's territorial view of jurisdiction, 2
courts based their decisions on considerations inconsistent with
Pennoyer's basic premise that jurisdiction flows from state power1
3
or even on outright fictions. One notable fiction was the supposed
"consent" to jurisdiction by nonresident motorists, who in fact
were most likely oblivious to the possibility of a lawsuit.
14
The tension created by these expansive decisions in the face of
formally restrictive doctrine inspired the Supreme Court's monu-
mental recasting of jurisdictional theory in International Shoe,
which has dominated jurisdictional theory since 1945. Just as the
vagaries of new fact situations strained Pennoyer's territorial view
of personal jurisdiction, however, the demands of subsequent cases
began to apply pressure to International Shoe's celebrated tests of
"contacts." This pressure has fostered two major tendencies in per-
sonal jurisdiction decisions. The first of these tendencies underval-
ues the interests of the parties. In deciding personal jurisdiction
questions, courts have assigned weight not only to the parties' in-
terests but also to the interests of individual forum states and of
the states collectively. Whether used to support jurisdiction-for
example, when a court identifies a strong forum interest in adjudi-
cating a dispute-or to defeat it-for example, when a court fears
that the forum's assertion of jurisdiction would impinge on another
state's sovereign rights-reliance on governmental interests has de-
tracted from the importance of International Shoe's focus on the
defendant's connections with the forum, the plaintiff's claim, and
any relationship between the claim and those connections. 15 The
second tendency appropriately keeps the focus on the parties but
overglorifies the contacts tests by treating them as the exclusive
measures of the forum's fairness. Until now, each of these tenden-
11. 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (overruled in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977),
to the extent that it is inconsistent with Shaffer's standard of determining personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant).
12. Pennoyer held that, with certain exceptions, a state could exercise jurisdiction in
an action involving the personal liability of a defendant only if the defendant were served
personally with process while in the state or voluntarily appeared before the court. 95 U.S.
at 734.
13. A salient example is the weight that the Court gave to a forum state's general
"interest" in asserting jurisdiction over persons outside its borders. See Lewis, The "Forum
State Interest" Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling
Constitutional Carts, 33 MERCER L. REv. 769, 771-83 (1982).
14. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160
(1916).
15, See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318-19.
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cies has been a barrier to a system of uniform jurisdictional
standards.
A. Individual Rights Versus Governmental Interests
Several post-International Shoe decisions pay at least rhetori-
cal homage to the role of governmental interests in the forum-se-
lecting process. Beginning with its first decisions after Interna-
tional Shoe, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated's or suggested 1"
that putative interests of the forum state are at least "relevant"
considerations in determining whether that forum is fair to the
parties. Even though this "forum state interest" doctrine seldom, if
ever, dictated the outcome of jurisdiction decisions,"' its persis-
tence in the language of judicial opinions posed an ongoing threat
that some ill-defined notion of states' rights might displace the
parties' forum-selection interests.' 9 The related governmental in-
terest concept of "interstate federalism" appeared somewhat later.
First in Hanson v. Denckla ° and later in World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,2 1 the Court stressed that the purposes of Inter-
national Shoe's contacts tests are not only to ensure that the
plaintiff's choice of forum is fair to the defendant, but also to pre-
serve the interests of the states as sovereigns.22
16. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1950); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
17. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
18. Only in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), did
the Court actually rely on the "forum state interest" doctrine to a degree that seemed im-
portant to the holding-that is, only in Mullane did the Court uphold the jurisdiction de-
spite forum-defendant contacts that lagged behind the contacts which the Court usually
recognizes as constitutionally sufficient to support jurisdiction. Moreover, even in Mullane
the Court could have rationalized its decision upholding jurisdiction strictly by reference to
considerations concerning fairness to the parties, with no reliance upon the interest of the
forum state. See infra notes 265-79 and accompanying text. Finally, in no case has the
Court struck down an assertion of jurisdiction when the defendant had the normally re-
quired contacts merely because the forum state had no discernible interest in the contro-
versy. Lewis, supra note 13, at 783-807; see infra text accompanying notes 274-79.
19. Lewis, supra note 13, at 828-32.
20. 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
21. 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980).
22. In World-Wide the Court vigorously renewed this sovereignty argument. It an-
nounced that a forum fair to the parties nevertheless might lack jurisdiction if its assertion
of jurisdiction offended the "sovereignty" of a putative alternative forum state: "[T]he Due
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to
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These governmental interest doctrines have impeded the de-
velopment of uniform standards for deciding jurisdictional ques-
tions by turning International Shoe's minimum contacts analysis
into a helter-skelter balancing process. Courts have had to juggle
the defendant's due process right to avoid suit in an unreasonable
forum, the plaintiff's due process right to bring suit in an otherwise
reasonable forum, the various unquantifiable interests of the forum
state in asserting jurisdiction, and the conjectural interests of other
states in asserting jurisdiction.23 This quagmire directly results
from the lack of any congruence between the policies underlying
the governmental interest doctrines and the policies of protecting
the individual rights of the parties.24 For example, a forum state
that a ,court independently adjudges fair to the litigants is no less
fair because the forum state lacks an interest in the controversy or
because its assertion of jurisdiction may threaten the sovereignty
of another state. Conversely, a forum unfair to the parties does not
become fair simply because that forum has an interest in deciding
the case. Accordingly, an increasing number of scholars now insist
that the interests of the parties should be the exclusive concern of
jurisdiction analysis.25
Even more important, recent Supreme Court decisions have
recognized-both implicitly and, with Ireland, explicitly-that the
due process question raised by the personal jurisdiction defense is
"ultimately" one of individual rights alone.28 In Rush v. Savchuk 7
divest the state of its power to render a valid judgment." 444 U.S. at 294. The Court did not
specify what exercises of jurisdiction would offend the sovereignty of another state.
23. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 716-17.
24. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 821; Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 1112, 1120-21 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L.
REv. 1015, 1016-17 (1983); Jay, "Minimum Contacts" As a Unified Theory of Jurisdiction:
A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 450 (1981); Lewis, supra note 8, at 733-35; Lewis, supra
note 13, at 810, 821; Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L.
REv. 185, 203 (1976); Redish, supra note 24, at 1135; Whitten, The Constitutional Limita-
tions on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (part 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735, 843 (1981).
But see Jay, supra, at 441.
Indeed, even some writers who cling to the view that courts to some degree may "con-
sider" state interests in the jurisdiction decision maintain that this consideration is merely
part of an appropriate balancing of the litigants' rights. See Drobak, supra, at 1055 n.157;
Redish, supra note 24, at 1141-43; Whitten, supra, at 843, 846. Despite the internal incon-
sistency of this position, see Lewis, supra note 13, at 818-20, what is most significant is the
emerging consensus that the sole rights at issue in the personal jurisdiction decision should
be those of the parties.
26. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 702 n.10 (1982); Lewis, supra note 8, at 734-35; Lewis supra note 13, at 808-13; cf.
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the Court seemed to approve rejection, or at least subordination, of
the forum state interest doctrine's role in personal jurisdiction.
The Court condemned an attempted shift of focus from the de-
fendant's forum contacts to the interests of the forum state, and it
emphasized the primacy of party-fairness over merely "relevant"
subsidiary factors, such as the interests of forum states.28 Later the
Court dealt a similar blow to the interests of the states collec-
tively-"interstate federalism." In Ireland29 the Court upheld an
exercise of jurisdiction even though the record did not display the
ordinarily required evidence of forum-defendant contacts and, as
Justice Powell complained in concurrence,30 thus failed to establish
the predicate for an exercise of jurisdiction consistent with notions
of state sovereignty. Writing for the majority, Justice White, the
author of World-Wide, all but obliterated World- Wide's dictum'
about interstate federalism by describing that concept "as ulti-
mately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the per-
sonal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no men-
tion of federalism concerns. '3 2 The Court's language surely is
broad enough to condemn in one stroke both forum state interest
and the notion of interstate federalism."3 By blunting and perhaps
even eliminating these concepts unrelated to party fairness, the
Court has cleared the way for unified jurisdictional standards or-
ganized entirely around the interests of the parties.
3 4
Redish, supra note 24, at 1121 (asserting that limits on the reach of personal jurisdiction, a
doctrine now well-established, had no constitutional basis prior to the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment and its focus on "any" person); Whitten, supra note 25, at 843 (arguing
that the Court has moved toward the use of the minimum contacts test itself to "intui-
tively" focus on the inconvenience to the defendant rather than on the state's interest in the
litigation).
27. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
28. Id. at 332. Admittedly, in the same passage the Court condemned a shift of focus
from the defendant's forum contacts to the contacts linking the forum and the plaintiff.
This observation is contrary to the argument-which this Article advances-that jurisdic-
tional due process should be as concerned with the plaintiff as with the defendant. See infra
text accompanying notes 87-113.
29. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). For a detailed analysis of Ireland's implications for personal
jurisdiction theory, see Lewis, supra note 8, at 727-42.
30. See 456 U.S. at 713-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. The references to sovereignty in World-Wide were entirely unnecessary to that
decision since the Court concluded independently that the defendant had "no" forum con-
tacts. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 715-16.
32. 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
33. Lewis, supra note 8, at 722-24, 739.
34. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 739-40; Recent Developments, Personal Jurisdiction in
Flux: Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 69 CORNELL L. REv.
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B. The Uneasy Coexistence of the "Contacts" Tests and the
Single Factor Satellite Bases of Jurisdiction
Admittedly, the second major post-International Shoe devel-
opment-the overglorifying of contacts analysis at the expense of
other measures of fairness to the parties-gains some support from
the pronouncement in Shaffer v. Heitner5 "that all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the stan-
dards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."36 Never-
theless, this broad statement need not have meant that the Court
was ordaining contacts tests as the sole, comprehensive touch-
stones of jurisdiction. For example, these "standards" might refer
instead to International Shoe's more general concern for "fair play
and substantial justice." Still, the Shaffer opinion repeatedly did
equate these "standards" with International Shoe's particularized
"minimum contacts" tests.3 7 The Court's next three personal juris-
diction decisions further confirmed that the International Shoe
"fair play" inquiry "must focus on 'the relationship among the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation' "s--in other words, the
tests of contacts. Moreover, none of these opinions employs any
tests other than "minimum contacts."
Late in the Shaffer opinion, however, the Court curiously
opened the door for noncontacts-based single factor tests for juris-
diction. The Court suggested that Delaware might have had juris-
diction over the nonresident corporate directors if it had "enacted
a statute that treats acceptance of a directorship [in a domestic
corporation] as consent to jurisdiction in the State."39 This sugges-
136, 164 (1983). Of course, many of the specific formulae for determining the scope of these
individual rights still speak in terms of connections with states; in that limited sense, the
rights are still a "consequence," "effect," or "by-product" of state boundaries. Drobak,
supra note 25, at 1016, 1033, 1047, 1064-66; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs §
4 comment a (1980). This view is possibly the source of the confusion about the real stakes
at issue. Lewis, supra note 8, at 707; see infra text accompanying note 46. For example,
Pennoyer itself, long regarded as the mother lode of sovereignty, may be read without tor-
turing its text as concerned in the end with individual rights, despite its territorially-laden
vocabulary. Drobak, supra note 25, at 1028-29; Lewis, supra note 8, at 704-05. The Supreme
Court has now recognized, however, that the parties' interests are paramount and accord-
ingly that their rights should govern the personal jurisdiction decision.
35. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
36. Id. at 212.
37. See, e.g., id. at 204, 207, 209.
38. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1981) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at
204); see also World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 291-93; Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92,
100-01 (1978).
39. 433 U.S. at 216. Sustaining jurisdiction on that basis would have represented a
small step beyond jurisdiction founded on more advertent forms of consent, which the Court
[Vol. 37:1
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tion implies that the Court considered certain forms of jurisdiction
consistent with "fair play and substantial justice" even though rec-
ognition of such forms represents a departure from a strict con-
tacts formula. Indeed, Shaffer recognized two other valid jurisdic-
tional doctrines-the rules governing adjudications of status and
jurisdiction by necessity.40 The Court further noted that these two
exceptions did not constitute an exhaustive catalogue of the doc-
trines that approve jurisdiction under circumstances deemed "fair"
to the defendant even when the defendant lacks sufficient contacts
to satisfy one of the minimum contacts tests.41 In short, the Court
authorized certain single factor bases of jurisdiction.
Ireland provided further evidence that the Shaffer Court re-
ally did not intend to subject every jurisdictional dispute to a con-
tacts test. The Court sustained jurisdiction in Ireland by finding
that the defendants' obstructive conduct-which effectively pre-
vented the plaintiff from adducing evidence of minimum con-
tacts-amounted to a waiver of the defendants' objections to juris-
diction.42 In upholding jurisdiction despite an insufficient showing
of contacts linking the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, the
Court acknowledged that a variety of tests-not just the assess-
ment of contacts-could indicate satisfaction of International
Shoe's "fair play" requirement.4 3
recently had approved without reliance on tests of contacts. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
40. See 433 U.S. at 208 n.30, 211 n.37. The "status" theory gives the state personal
jurisdiction over an absent defendant because of the defendant's status as a member of an
identifiable group. See generally Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Traynor,
Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tax. L. REv. 655, 660-61 (1959). "Jurisdiction by
necessity" arises when there is no other forum available to the plaintiff in which to bring the
action. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. The Court in Shaffer specifically declined to
decide whether "the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." Id.
41. See 433 U.S. at 208 n.30. Even before Shaffer the Court had recognized that these
two other theories of jurisdiction survived International Shoe. Although Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1957), treated the International Shoe contacts analysis as embracing "in rem"
and "in personam" jurisdiction, the Court observed that those classifications "do not ex-
haust all the situations that give rise to jurisdiction . . . ." 357 U.S. at 246. In citing Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942), in the accompanying footnote, the Court recognized that stan-
dards other than the minimum contacts test apply to cases of jurisdiction by necessity and
status adjudications. 357 U.S. at 246 & n.13.
42. 456 U.S. at 704-05.
43. By contrast, in Kulko, World-Wide, and Rush the evidence in the record was ame-
nable to contacts analysis. Further, none of these decisions, unlike Ireland, raised a question
concerning any of the consent, jurisdiction by necessity, or status exceptions that had qui-
etly coexisted alongside contacts analysis in the years preceding Shaffer.
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A comparison of Justice Powell's approach in the concurring
opinion to the majority's approach illustrates the majority's retreat
from Shaffer's exaltation of minimum contacts as an omnibus ju-
risdictional test. Justice Powell framed the issue in Ireland nar-
rowly: "Whether 'minimum contacts' exist between [the defen-
dants] and the forum State that would justify the State in
exercising personal jurisdiction.""" In contrast, the majority harked
back to International Shoe and proclaimed that "the test for per-
sonal jurisdiction requires only that 'the maintenance of the suit
...not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice " 45 -apparently regardless of whether the customary defend-
ant-forum contacts are present. Ireland, therefore, plainly implied
that the current Court does not insist on minimum contacts as an
invariable constitutional requirement,46 but rather views them only
as nonexclusive particularized tests that help to answer the ulti-
mate question-whether jurisdiction comports with fair play and
substantial justice to the parties.
Thus, recent Supreme Court decisions make the articulation
of uniform jurisdictional standards more feasible today than at any
time since International Shoe. First, with the distractions of the
forum state interest and interstate federalism concepts put aside,
jurisdiction analysis can concentrate exclusively on the due process
rights of the parties. Second, despite Shaffer's broad injunction,
subsequent cases culminating with Ireland demonstrate that the
Court actually has used a variety of tests-not just minimum con-
tacts tests-to resolve those questions of individual rights. In sum,
the time is ripe to attempt to articulate a uniform set of standards
adequate to accommodate all of these jurisdictional tests.
44. 456 U.S. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 703.
46. Id. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring). The majority protested that it did not dispense
with evidence of minimum contacts, but rather was willing to presume such evidence as a
punishment for the defendants' refusal to cooperate in discovery proceedings aimed at as-
certaining the jurisdictional facts. Id. at 702 n.10. The accompanying text, however, actually
indicates that the majority, unlike Justice Powell, found insufficient evidence of contacts
and therefore upheld jurisdiction independently on grounds of waiver. See id. at 703-05.
Thus, Ireland is authority for the proposition that individual liberty interests may be satis-
fied in some cases even without evidence of defendant-forum contacts. Recent Develop-
ments, supra note 34, at 163.
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C. Pinpointing International Shoe's "Standards of Fair Play and
Substantial Justice". The Criteria of Expectation and Benefit
Following the Supreme Court's example, commentators have
grappled with diverse theories of jurisdiction but have failed to ar-
ticulate a unified approach. At one extreme, certain scholars con-
tend that Shaffer already provides a "uniform" or "unified" ap-
proach to jurisdiction.47 These scholars, however, differ as to what
the supposedly uniform standard emanating from Shaffer actually
is. Some describe this standard as a free floating, amorphous one of
"fair play and substantial justice" or "reasonableness," 48 while
others see it as a particularized test of minimum contacts. 9 Among
the former group, some limit "fairness" and "reasonableness" to
the interests of one or both parties, while others view the same
concepts as also concerned with the individual or collective inter-
ests of the states.50 Of course, the view that Shaffer requires a uni-
fied approach limited to minimum contacts analysis simply over-
looks other decisions that approve, without regard to minimum
contacts, satellite "single factor" bases such as consent, waiver,
domicile, state of incorporation, and personal service within the
state. For example, Ireland, in reaffirming the express consent and
waiver bases,51 sustained jurisdiction even though the plaintiff was
unable to demonstrate the forum-defendant contacts that the min-
imum contacts rubric requires.
At the other extreme, advocates of the "substantive interest"
view implicitly oppose jurisdictional standards that focus solely on
the parties' rights and instead incorporate various public interests
and policies in the personal jurisdiction decision.2 While different
47. See, e.g., Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction The-
ory?, 26 KAN. L. lzv. 61, 83 (1977); Fischer, "Minimum Contacts": Shaffer's Unified Juris-
dictional Test, 12 VA. U.L. Rav. 25, 27 (1977); Jay, supra note 25, at 429; Posnak, A Uni-
form Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the
"Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 771 (1981); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Over
Foreigners, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 67, 75 n.43 (1979); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme
Court Establishes a Uniform Approach to State Court Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 131, 140, 152 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Uniform Approach].
48. See, e.g., Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Over Foreigners, supra note 47, at 75
n.43; Note, Uniform Approach, supra note 47, at 152.
49. See Fischer, supra note 47, at 45.
50. See Drobak, supra note 25, at 1041-42 nn.116-19.
51. See 456 U.S. at 703-05.
52. Foremost among this group are Professors Carrington and Martin, who argue that
the constitutionally requisite quantum of defendant-forum contacts "does and should vary
with the measure of the values affected and the costs inflicted by the attempted exercise of
power." Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Court, 66
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rationales underlie the various substantive interest theories,53 all at
least tacitly agree that a sufficiently great forum state interest may
justify an exercise of jurisdiction even without the ordinarily re-
quired defendant-forum contacts.54 Whatever merit these govern-
mental interest justifications may have had in the past, little re-
mains after the Supreme Court's de facto exclusion of
governmental interests from jurisdiction analysis in Rush and
Ireland.
55
MICH. L. REV. 227, 230 (1967-68). Substantive interest advocates frankly admit that they
echo the approach of basing jurisdiction decisions on state interests (for example, the inter-
ests in regulating conduct or affording residents a forum) that reigned during the waning
years of the Pennoyer regime. See Carrington & Martin, supra, at 228-29; Comment, The
Reasonableness Standard in State-Court Jurisdiction: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Uniform
Minimum Contacts Theory, 14 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 51, 68-69 (1978). For a summary and
critique of this forum state interest doctrine, see Lewis, supra note 13, at 776-81.
53. Some commentators argue that the influence of substantive considerations on ju-
risdictional decisions often is unavoidable. Comment, supra note 52, at 68, 70. These com-
mentators cite cases raising first amendment and commerce clause issues as examples of
situations in which substantive considerations necessarily intrude in the jurisdiction deci-
sion. See id. at 70 n.104; Note, Due Process and Long Arm Jurisdiction in Minnesota: A
Criticism of the Minimum Contacts Standard, 5 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 326-28 (1979);
see also Note, Exercise of Jurisdiction Over a Newspaper Vacated on the Basis of the First
Amendment, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 726 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Limitations on
State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHL L. REV. 156, 173-77 (1982); Comment, Long-Arm
Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 342 (1967).
Others insist that the defendant's forum contacts must have "substantive relevance" to the
plaintiff's claim to ensure that the defendant's conduct is a proper subject of state substan-
tive regulation. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 77, 81, 86.
In two cases decided this Term, the Court unanimously and "categorically" has rejected
"the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into the jurisdictional analysis. The
infusion of such considerations would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry."
Calder v. Jones, No. 82-1401 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 82-
485, at n.12 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984) (available March 22, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Sup
file). This rejection is fully consistent with the Court's recent emphasis on the rights of the
individual parties rather than on substantive considerations related to the plaintiff's claim.
54. For example, Justice Brennan suggested in his dissent in World-Wide and Rush
that a high level of forum state interest in the litigation may justify jurisdiction even absent
the ordinarily required contacts unless the defendant can show "some real injury to a con-
stitutionally protected interest." Rush, 444 U.S. at 333; World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 312; see
also McDougal, supra note 6, at 5.
55. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text. Even analysts who concede that the
forum state interest doctrine is on the wane and reject it in principle because of its potential
for damaging individual rights seem unable to break the attachment. See Drobak, supra
note 25, at 1055-56 n.157; Redish, supra note 24, at 1139-42. A fondness born of tradition,
inertia, or perhaps even sentiment for the substantive interest approach stands between
these commentators and the logical conclusion that government interest factors should not
enter into the jurisdictional decision at all.
Professor Drobak, for example, after acknowledging that personal jurisdiction analysis
is concerned entirely with individual rights, nevertheless takes issue with this author's posi-
tion, Lewis, supra note 13, at 769, that forum state interests should play no part whatsoever
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Finally, an intermediate view, espoused by Professors Haz-
ard58 and Vernon,57 maintains that International Shoe has the po-
tential to displace Pennoyer as the basis of a general jurisdictional
theory if it is supplemented to encompass the noncontacts, "satel-
lite" tests. Professor Hazard, writing before Shaffer, saw the need
for a supplement because he considered International Shoe as nar-
rowly focused on a "minimum-contacts approach" or a "minimum-
contacts principle. '58  Professor Vernon, with the hindsight of
Shaffer, could state the problem more specifically. He was per-
plexed that while the Shaffer Court proclaimed that "all" exercises
of jurisdiction must satisfy the standards of International
Shoe-which the Court said required a "minimum contacts" nexus
in the decision. He agrees that the Supreme Court has failed to provide meaningful consti-
tutional limits on choice of law despite decades of references to forum state interests in its
jurisdiction decisions. His conclusion, though, is that "[u]ntil the Court, or Congress, estab-
lishes these limits, the personal jurisdiction doctrine may as well be used as best it
can"-that is, as an end run method of promoting the states' legitimate choice of law con-
cerns. See Drobak, supra note 25, at 1055-56 n.157.
Professor Drobak's argument is vulnerable to the objection that two wrongs do not
make a right. The Court has erred in failing to impose workable constitutional restrictions
on a state court's choice of substantive law, and it should not compound that error by al-
lowing judges to uphold jurisdiction in a forum unfair to the defendant simply because the
state has an interest in the proceeding. Nor should a plaintiff lose access to a fair forum
because the forum state has no discernible interest in the controversy, as when the parties
to a contract agree in advance on a forum that has no other connection with the parties or
the transaction. See infra part IV, section C.
Further, as Professor Drobak appears to concede, the Supreme Court's passing refer-
ences to forum state interests in its personal jurisdiction decisions have had no evident im-
pact on the outcome of the decisions. As a result, personal jurisdiction doctrine has been a
wholly ineffective device for promoting the states' very real choice of law concerns. (As both
Professor Drobak and this author agree, the full faith and credit clause is better suited than
the due process clause to address state interests in choice of law disputes.) If the Supreme
Court erroneously perceives that its passing references to the governmental interest doc-
trines in cases raising the personal jurisdiction issue have protected those state interests,
that perception may be retarding the development of truly effective constitutional choice of
law rules in cases raising the choice of law issue directly. If, however, the Court realized that
the attempt to impose meaningful constitutional choice of law restrictions through personal
jurisdiction decisions has failed, it would be more likely to try to develop those restrictions
in cases directly raising questions about choice of law. Lewis, supra note 13, at 835. Profes-
sor Drobak says he is "not so optimistic" because he thinks "the Court's feeble attempts in
the constitutional choice of law cases indicate the difficulty and enormity of the task re-
quired to create workable constitutional limits." Drobak, supra note 25, at 1055-56 n.157. If,
however, the task is as difficult as he says even when tackled head on-that is, in choice of
law cases-the task should prove all the more difficult when approached obliquely, in per-
sonal jurisdiction cases.
56. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241.
57. Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the
Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273.
58. See Hazard, supra note 56, at 242, 288.
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among the forum, the litigation, and the defendant-the Court at
the same time expressly excepted from its contacts requirements
some traditional single factor bases of jurisdiction. 59 This third
view thus identifies an inconsistency in current doctrine that Ire-
land has only intensified.
Merging the contacts-based and noncontacts-based strands of
personal jurisdiction theory could correct this inconsistency. By
upholding jurisdiction in Ireland despite its express understanding
that the record did not display the ordinarily required minimum
contacts, the Court has hinted at the existence of broader stan-
dards of fair play and substantial justice to the parties that over-
ride-although they certainly embrace-the particularized con-
tacts tests.6° Of course, precisely identifying these broader
standards of fair play is the key task in any attempt to unify the
theory of jurisdiction.
Perhaps the surest method of locating the all-important crite-
ria of fair play is to root out the standards that underlie the preva-
lent contacts tests. Presumably the judges who formulated these
tests thought them adequate to meet minimum constitutional re-
quirements of fairness. The most common model of the minimum
contacts test emphasizes "claim-relatedness." As announced in its
unadorned form the test requires only a nexus between the plain-
tiff's claim and a single forum contact of the defendant, so that the
claim "relates to" or "arises out of" the contact.61 The Court's sub-
sequent restatements of the test have encumbered it with addi-
tional restrictions. Hanson v. Denckla required that the defend-
ant's forum contact must have been "purposeful. ' 62 Kulko v.
Superior Court, in the domestic relations setting, implied that the
59. Vernon, supra note 57, at 294.
60. A quarter century ago, in the wake of Hanson v. Denckla's strict approach to de-
fendant-forum contacts, one commentator astutely perceived that "fair play and substantial
justice" does not require "that all persons subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a state
court have 'certain minimum contacts' with that state." Comment, In Personam Jurisdic-
tion in Multiple-Party Suits, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 643, 650 (1959).
61. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
62. See 357 U.S. at 253-54. Hanson's "purposefulness" accretion was the Court's first
expression of concern for sovereignty since International Shoe. See 357 U.S. at 251, 253. To
the extent that Ireland vitiates a concern for sovereignty, the Court may be willing to relax
or to abandon the purposefulness requirement of the claim-related test of contacts. More
recently, however, the Court has defended the requirement in different terms. Specifically,
the Court has suggested that a defendant who purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
conducting forum activities "has clear notice that [he] is subject to suit there." World-Wide,
444 U.S. at 297. This observation reflects the Court's view that the purposefulness require-
ment relates to fairness to the individual defendant rather than just to sovereignty. See
infra text accompanying note 76.
[Vol. 37:1
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
contact must have been made in the course of commercial rela-
tions." World-Wide tilted the balance even more toward the de-
fendant by insisting that the purposeful, arguably commercial,
claim-related contact must have generated some nontrivial benefit
to the defendant in a noncollateral way.6 4 Finally, Rush explained
that "each defendant" must have the requisite contacts, and that
neither contacts by the plaintiff nor supposed interests of the fo-
rum state may substitute for contacts of the defendant.
65
The other major contacts test demands multiple defendant-
forum contacts of a regular, substantial, and continuous nature,
but dispenses with the requirement of a link between any of those
contacts and the plaintiff's claim. This test, which stood on its own
in Perkins v. Behquet Consolidated Mining Co.,6 has its roots in
International Shoe, in which the Court recognized jurisdiction
over businesses whose "continuous corporate operations within a
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities. '6 7 Strangely, Shaffer's formulation of
the contacts requirement ignored this jurisdictional basis alto-
gether. Moreover, the Court's next three decisions68 also insisted
on contacts affiliating the defendant, the forum, and the litigation;
thus these decisions in effect required a relationship between at
least one of the defendant's forum contacts and the plaintiff's
claim. A careful reading of Rush, however, leaves little doubt that
a basis of jurisdiction founded on the defendant's multiple forum
contacts entirely unrelated to the plaintiff's claim did survive
Shaffer. In Rush the Court implied that jurisdiction over the de-
fendant's insurer would have been fair "even for an unrelated
cause of action," given the scope and extent of that insurer's non-
claim-related forum contacts. 9
These polar definitions of minimum contacts-at one extreme,
a purposeful, beneficial, claim-related forum contact; at the other,
63. See 436 U.S. at 94-95.
64. Lewis, supra note 13, at 792-804; see World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298-99.
65. 444 U.S. at 332.
66. 342 U.S. 437 (1952); see Lewis, supra note 13, at 793.
67. 326 U.S. at 318.
68. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
69. 444 U.S. at 330. Perhaps Shaffer did not address explicitly this brand of nonclaim-
related minimum contacts jurisdiction because the Court believed that the forum contacts
of the nonresident corporate directors and officers were too insubstantial even to invoke that
version of the contacts tests.
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a series of regular, substantial, and continuous but not claim-re-
lated forum contacts-facilitate the identification of the broader
criteria of fair play. Underpinning the claim-related or "nexus"
test is an elusive concept of expectation, sometimes also described
as anticipation,7" foreseeability,7 1 or fair notice.72 From the nexus
test's requirement of minimally purposeful forum-related activity,
judges in effect fashion a conclusive presumption that a nonresi-
dent whose conduct affects a foreign state reasonably should ex-
pect to defend in that state any lawsuit challenging that conduct. 5
Although "foreseeability" is an alternative label for the expec-
tation criterion, expectation as used here does not refer to "fore-
seeability" of the type that World-Wide condemned: "the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. 74
The kind of expectation proposed here, like the kind of foresee-
ability that the World- Wide Court found "critical" to due process,
arises only when "the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there. '75 Unfortunately, though, the Supreme
Court apparently has not been convinced that even this rigorous
level of foreseeability will satisfy due process, since, at least until
Ireland the Court also has required that the defendant have pur-
70. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297.
71. See Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Reflections on
the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE DAMS LAW. 65, 80 (1980).
72. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
73. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 781-82. As Justice Stevens said, "If I visit another
State, or acquire real estate or open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that
the State will exercise its power over my property or my person while there. My contact
with the State, though minimal, gives rise to predictable risks." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218
(Stevens, J., concurring).
The World-Wide Court evidently recognized this rationale for the claim-related con-
tacts test when it described Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IlM.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), as holding that jurisdiction lies against a nonresident who
"delivers products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum State." 444 U.S. at 298. A more detailed discussion of the
variable contours of the expectation criterion appears in part IV of this Article, which as-
sesses a number of the noncontacts, satellite bases of jurisdiction in terms of that criterion.
74. 444 U.S. at 297.
75. Id. (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97-98, and Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216). Thus, the
Court correctly stated that purposefulness, its recent accretion to the claim-related test of
contacts, is significant because it enables a court to impute to the defendant an expectation
of suit in the forum. See supra note 62. In two very recent decisions, the Court has cited the
quoted statement from World-Wide in upholding exercises of jurisdiction justified only
doubtfully by defendant-forum contacts. Calder v. Jones, No. 82-1401 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 82-485 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984) (available Mar. 22, 1984
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Sup file).
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poseful, beneficial forum contacts. 76 This invariable insistence on
76. In addition to "foreseeability," the World-Wide Court seemed to insist that due
process requires that a defendant's claim-related contacts with the forum be purposeful and
that the defendant derive more than a "marginal" benefit from these contacts. Although the
purposefulness and benefit requirements of a claim-related test of contacts may predict the
requisite expectation of suit in that forum, they should not be invariable prerequisites to
jurisdiction. If, as World-Wide states, the purposeful element is useful only because it justi-
fies imputing to the defendant an expectation of having to defend in that forum, why insist
on a purposeful contact when the facts fairly enable the same imputation without one? If
the purposeful requirement instead serves to further "interstate sovereignty," as Hanson
suggested, 357 U.S. at 251, 253, it should wash out in the wake of Ireland with the demise of
that governmental interest consideration. Similarly, a "benefit" requirement is questionable
if meant as an invariable limitation on jurisdiction. The Court in Kulko seemed to recognize
that jurisdiction should exist in situations completely outside the commercial realm, so long
as the Court's conceptions of expectation about suit were satisfied. See 436 U.S. at 96 (hy-
pothetical of "shooting bullet from one State into another"). Of course, the overall tone of
the Kulko opinion seems to contradict this assertion; indeed, commentators frequently view
Kulko as requiring that contacts, to be sufficient, must occur in a commercial setting. See
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
If no such commercial contact requirement exists, the Court's insistence that a defen-
dant's forum contacts be beneficial, and not just enable a prediction about foreseeablility of
suit, probably explains the result in Kulko. The Kulko Court observed that the New York
father could not "reasonably have anticipated" suit in a California forum, 436 U.S. at 97-98,
even though he had arranged for his daughter to fly to California to live with her mother,
and thus probably should have foreseen that a later action for child support might take
place in California. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 296. The Court stressed that sending the
daughter to California, while arguably a purposeful forum contact, would not provide de-
fendant father any benefit. Id. at 94-95, 100.
An alternative explanation of Kulko is that the Court denied California's jurisdiction
because a contrary decision would have imposed an "unreasonable burden on family rela-
tions" by discouraging parents in similar situations from acquiescing in their children's
wishes. 436 U.S. at 98. The Court later referred to this jurisdictional consideration as "the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."
World- Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. With the hindsight of Ireland, which so seriously questions
the relevance of governmental interests to jurisdictional decisionmaking, this "shared inter-
est" factor pales as an explanation of the result in Kulko. At best this interest was an under-
lying, emotionally loaded concern that tilted the Court's standard, contacts-based analysis
against jurisdiction in an otherwise close case. Further, general reliance on this factor would
not be widely useful for deciding challenges to personal jurisdiction because there are few
issues, other than the "best interests of the child," upon which all of the states so evidently
and strongly agree.
That the plaintiff could have pursued her claimed right to child support in California
under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), while still
allowing the defendant to appear and defend in his home state of New York, 436 U.S. at 98-
100, provides yet another explanation of the result in Kulko. The Court considered the
URESA procedure significant because it would have furthered the forum state's interest in
providing for the welfare of resident minors without the state's having to assert jurisdiction.
436 U.S. at 98. Of course, this state interest rationale also loses force after Rush and Ire-
land, but the same procedure is also significant from another standpoint: it shows that the
plaintiff's need to secure jurisdiction at home was not overwhelming.
This author favors asserting jurisdiction when the plaintiff has an interest in avoiding
fragmented litigation if, from the defendant's perspective, the expectation or benefit criteria
are satisfied. See infra part III. The converse, however, does not follow. If jurisdiction is fair
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purposeful, beneficial contacts misapprehends the limited function
of a claim-related contacts test: to serve as a nonexhaustive predic-
tor of the broader criterion of expectation. Thus expectation-the
capacity of a reasonable person in the defendant's position to fore-
see that a particular claim may be brought against him in the fo-
rum-is not only critical to due process but also should be suffi-
cient to satisfy it, regardless of the nature or level of the
defendant's forum contacts.
As in the criminal law, it would often be impossible for courts
to ascertain defendants' actual subjective expectations about place
of suit. Evidence of actual subjective expectations is seldom availa-
ble. Moreover, many defendants do not expect that their conduct
will give rise to litigation anywhere, as would always be true when
the plaintiff asserts a wholly novel cause of action. Accordingly, the
measure of expectations should be objective.7 7 The court must as-
sume, somewhat arbitrarily, that the defendant contemplated that
his forum-related conduct would result in a lawsuit somewhere; on
that assumption the court realistically may inquire whether a rea-
sonable person in the defendant's position should have expected to
defend that claim in the forum.
How readily a court concludes that a reasonable person in the
defendant's position should have expected suit in a particular fo-
rum state on a particular claim will vary with the source and pro-
bative value of the evidence about expectations. In the usual case
the only evidence relevant to these expectations that will be addu-
cible at a hearing on jurisdiction will be intrinsic to the lawsuit-it
will consist of the facts about the defendant's allegedly actionable
conduct and the place where that conduct occurred or had reason-
ably foreseeable effects. In such cases a court should proceed cau-
tiously before concluding that a reasonable person in the defend-
ant's position should have expected to defend the particular claim
in the particular forum picked by the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the
to the defendant under either or both criteria of expectation or benefit, there is no reason to
deny jurisdiction simply because the plaintiff, as in Kulko, has a somewhat diluted interest
in proceeding in that forum. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 82-485 (U.S. March
20, 1984) (available March 22, 1984 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Sup file). Thus, if the de-
fendant father in Kulko should have been held to have expected any later child support
action to be brought in California once he assisted his daughter in relocating there, jurisdic-
tion should not have failed just because the plaintiff mother had other litigation options. If,
however, as the Court itself found, 436 U.S. at 97-98, the father could not fairly be held to
have anticipated such a suit from his isolated California contact, the decision in Kulko is
sound quite apart from the absence of any personal benefit from his contact.
77. Cf. Ripple & Murphy, supra note 71, at 81.
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situs of the defendant's conduct at issue in the lawsuit may often
be enough, standing alone, to fairly support an inference of the re-
quired expectations. For example, if the plaintiff proves that the
defendant's assertedly actionable conduct took place in or
foreseeably affected State X, and State X is the forum, may it not
be fairly concluded that a reasonable potential defendant (assum-
ing he contemplated suit somewhere) should have included State
X among the states in which he might be called to account? In-
deed, on close examination, nonresident motorist statutes and
other widely accepted means of securing personal jurisdiction that
are rationalized in terms of contacts in fact may be constitutionally
valid today only on this broader rationale of expectations gener-
ated by the situs of the defendant's challenged activity.78
A court should be far less hesitant to find that a reasonable
person in the defendant's position ought to have expected to de-
fend a particular claim in a particular state when extrinsic evi-
dence of such an expectation is present-that is, evidence about
circumstances, other than the defendant's conduct at issue in the
lawsuit, that should put the potential defendant on notice of where
an action might be brought. Examples of such circumstances in-
clude forum selection clauses in contracts, other affirmative indica-
tions of consent to jurisdiction, and state long-arm statutes that
are keyed to specific transactions. These circumstances usually will
enable courts to conclude fairly and confidently that the hypothet-
ical reasonable defendant who contemplates suit should have ex-
pected to be sued in the state designated by the long-arm statute,
contractual agreement, or other medium of consent. Fundamental
fairness does suggest, however, two caveats on this rationale. First,
78. The conventional contacts based rationale for nonresident motorist statutes is ar-
guably in jeopardy after the restrictive refinements of Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94-95, and World-
Wide, 444 U.S. at 298-99, that the defendant's claim-related forum contacts must be not
only purposeful but also commercial or at least substantially "beneficial." But see Posnak,
supra note 47, at 805 n.377 (arguing that Kulko and World-Wide should not be read liter-
ally to require commercial or beneficial activity as a prerequisite to contacts-based jurisdic-
tion, since under that reading the Court inadvertently would be undercutting the basis of
jurisdiction in situations in which jurisdiction has traditionally been upheld). The jeopardy
arises because the only benefit a nonresident motorist derives from driving into another
state is the exercise of the right to interstate travel, which he already enjoys under the
privileges and immunities clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
If the expectation criterion superseded contacts analysis, however, the commercial ac-
tivity and benefit hurdles of Kulko and World-Wide could be bypassed. Jurisdiction then
would be fair if a court concluded that the defendant, by driving within the forum even on a
purely noncommercial venture, should have expected that any litigation resulting from that
activity would take place in the forum.
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the evidence must show that the statute, forum selection clause, or
other extrinsic source of the defendant's expectations about place
of suit likely will put the defendant on notice that his conduct
might subject him to the jurisdiction of a particular state. Second,
if the extrinsic source of the defendant's expectations about place
of suit is his own agreement, that agreement must be voluntary in
the sense that the defendant could have withheld it without sacri-
ficing a preexisting constitutional right. 9
Just as scrutiny of the claim-related contacts test shows it to
be a surrogate for expectation about place of suit, scrutiny of the
alternative contacts test of regular, substantial, but nonclaim-re-
lated contacts shows it to be a surrogate for the substantial benefit
the defendant has reaped or sought to reap from his ongoing con-
nections with the forum. Wholly apart from a defendant's expecta-
tions of where a particular claim might be filed, the benefits and
protections that he has received or anticipates receiving from the
forum state fairly warrant imposing on him a reciprocal obligation
to defend any civil claim in that state.80 The Supreme Court's
awareness of this linkage surfaced in International Shoe. The
Court in International Shoe presumed that the defendant's sys-
tematic, continuous, and substantial forum contacts yielded him
"the benefits and protection of the laws of the state," and those
benefits, in turn, justified jurisdiction under a "conception of fair
play and substantial justice."81 Later the Court expressly applied
this rationale in Perkins."2
If, then, the defendant's benefits from the forum state and his
reasonable expectations of suit there form the theoretical substruc-
ture of the minimum contacts tests, those two broader criteria
should serve as the ultimate measures of jurisdictional fair play.
Acceptance of this hypothesis would improve jurisdictional analy-
sis in several respects. First, courts could apply the contacts tests
to a broader range of circumstances.8 ' Courts have unduly cramped
79. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919) (holding unconstitutional an exercise of
jurisdiction based on the non-resident defendant's implied "consent" assertedly flowing
from his having chosen to transact interstate business affecting the forum, because he had a
preexisting right to conduct such business under the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution).
80. Lewis, supra note 13, at 782-83.
81. 326 U.S. at 320. Of course, systematic contacts also lead to an element of expecta-
tion. A defendant having substantial, ongoing connections with a state arguably should ex-
pect to defend in that state any lawsuit brought against him.
82. 342 U.S. at 446-48.
83. See infra part IIL
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the scope of the contacts tests by failing to appreciate that they
are merely means to the end of ascertaining the requisite level of
the defendant's expectation or benefit, and that even these criteria
must be considered against the countervailing interests of the
plaintiff. Second, acknowledgment that the underlying criteria of
expectation and benefit-and not the contacts tests them-
selves-are determinative would justify explicit reliance on the
"single factor" particularized tests not based on contacts. If inde-
pendently recognized, these satellite tests, which have coexisted
uneasily with the "multiple factor""4 contacts tests that Shaffer
misleadingly endorsed as universal guides to decision, could serve
alongside the contacts tests to assure the satisfaction of one or
both of the ultimate fairness criteria. Third, in the event that an
exercise of jurisdiction fails all the contacts and noncontacts tests,
the hypothesis would allow a plaintiff to argue that jurisdiction in
the forum would nevertheless be fair to the parties because of the
presence of one or both of the ultimate fairness criteria.
A theory of personal jurisdiction that accepts expectation and
benefit as all-important criteria for assessing fair play and substan-
tial justice would authorize a variety of particularized jurisdic-
tional tests of two basic kinds: First, the prevalent tests that assess
the defendant's forum contacts, suitably modified to enhance their
roles as indicators of expectation or benefit; and second, those sin-
gle factor tests that can withstand scrutiny under the broad crite-
ria. The contacts tests would continue to govern most cases, since
the bulk of litigated personal jurisdiction motions probably cannot
be resolved by reference to a single factor. A smaller number of
cases would turn on a valid single factor test-one not now based
on contacts but deemed consistent with either a modified contacts
test or one of the ultimate fairness criteria. The single factor tests
typically would be more economical to apply than the full-blown
contacts tests because of the necessarily limited scope of the analy-
sis required to evaluate them in any given case. 5 Finally, when
84. See Vernon, supra note 57, at 277-78.
85. As part IV discusses, many of the "single factor" bases of jurisdiction actually
require consideration of a number of jurisdictionally significant facts. Domicile, one familiar
example, demands reference to various circumstances relating to a defendant's physical, eco-
nomic, political, and social connections with a forum. Nevertheless, the inquiry in most
cases would still be more narrow than an appraisal of the regularity, continuity, and magni-
tude of a defendant's forum contacts under a Perkins-type analysis of nonclaim-related con-
tacts, see Lewis, supra note 13, at 782-83 & n.73, or an appraisal of the purposefulness or
beneficial nature of a defendant's forum contact, and the degree of relatedness between that
contact and the plaintiff's claim, under a claim-related analysis.
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none of the contacts-based or noncontacts-based particularized
tests justifies jurisdiction, the plaintiff still would be able to argue
that jurisdiction is fair as between the parties because of the satis-
faction of one or both of the ultimate fairness criteria. 6
The chart on the following page depicts the relationships
among these jurisdictional tests and their role in a system that is
organized around the uniform criteria of expectation and benefit.
In part III this Article will explore four modifications to the partic-
ularized minimum contacts tests that are necessary to reconcile
those tests with their function of signalling satisfaction of the fair-
ness criteria. Part IV then will consider how each of eleven satellite
bases of jurisdiction not explicitly geared to contacts would fare
under the proposed scheme.
86. Given the wide range of particularized jurisdictional bases available, however, this
argument should seldom prevail; courts should even approach it with a bias against jurisdic-
tion. The contacts tests certainly are preferable to an ad hoc direct resort to the fairness
criteria, because their satisfaction depends upon the determination of relatively objective
facts. In contrast, a direct inquiry into whether the circumstances warrant imputing to the
defendant an expectation of suit in the forum, or subjecting him to jurisdiction because of
benefits that he has derived from the forum state, is considerably more open-ended and
fraught with subjective judgments. Nevertheless, direct access to the ultimate criteria
should remain open since the particularized tests simply facilitate drawing conclusions
about expectation and benefit, and those criteria, in turn, are the ultimate signifiers of fo-
rum fairness between the parties.
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III. FOUR PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF THE MINIMUM CONTACTS
TESTS
The recognition that the overriding criteria of expectation and
benefit should guide jurisdictional decisionmaking counsels at least
four modifications to the minimum contacts tests as the Court has
elaborated them through Rush v. Savchuk.
A. Recognizing the Plaintiff's Interests in Avoiding Fragmented
Litigation
Due process protects any "person" from the unfair deprivation
of property, and clearly one such person is the civil plaintiff. A
state-created civil claim is a species of fourteenth amendment
property that due process safeguards from arbitrary deprivation.87
In the context of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff may suffer depri-
vation of property by having to prosecute that claim in inconven-
ient or multiple forums, in much the same way that a nonresident
defendant suffers such deprivation by having to defend in an un-
fair forum. A nonresident defendant who is unable to mount a de-
fense in a distant forum may face a default judgment and conse-
quently forfeit his defenses on the merits. Similarly, a plaintiff
may lack the resources to conduct litigation far from home or to
fund several overlapping suits against multiple defendants, not all
of whom are amenable to jurisdiction in a single forum. In this
light the plaintiff's and defendant's interests in the jurisdiction
question are essentially the same: each seeks an effective opportu-
nity to secure a judicial determination of the issues.8
While in some cases "the desirability of giving the plaintiff a
forum in which to adjudicate his claim""" may outweigh the pro-
tection afforded defendants by a focus on contacts,90 the Court's
87. See Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); Forbes Pioneer
Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922); infra note 277 and accompanying text;
see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-30 (1982) (claims before state
administrative agency must receive full due process protection); cf. Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980) (due process not denied by application of state immunity to
defeat tort claim).
88. Lewis, supra note 13, at 810.
89. Comment, supra note 60, at 652. The author argues that "fairness to all the par-
ties" is more consistent with due process than an exclusive concern with defendants. Id.
90. Justice Brennan emphasized this point when he wrote in his World-Wide dissent
that the interests of "other parties ... are entitled to as much weight as are the interests of
the defendant." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In the same sentence Justice Brennan also suggested that the interests of "the
forum State" merit comparable weight. For reasons stated previously, see supra text accom-
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recent decisions reflect an "almost exclusive focus on the rights of
defendants."' In Kulko the Court stated that the process due to
defendants is "essential," while the plaintiff's interests are merely
to be "considered. '" 2 Rush then specifically condemned an attempt
to shift the focus of decision from the defendant's contacts to those
of the plaintiff." This "defendant oriented" 94 approach is consis-
tent with Shaffer's focus on the triangular relationship "among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation."9 5 In sum, the current
bias of personal jurisdiction doctrine tilts sharply in favor of the
defendant.9 6
Unfortunately, some theorists who would redress this imbal-
ance have seized on the forum's convenience to the plaintiff as the
crux of his interest in the jurisdiction question. 7 The origin of this
solicitude for plaintiffs, however, is the discredited forum state in-
terest doctrine, 8 which never adequately protected many plain-
tiffs' interests because its chief concern was to provide a forum for
forum residents. 9 More important, this characterization of the
plaintiff's interests is overbroad. Emphasis on a factor as vague
and conjectural as the forum's convenience to the plaintiff would
call on trial judges to use practically unbridled discretion in sorting
through a plethora of considerations: the relative distances the
panying notes 23-24, this Article strongly disagrees with the latter part of his observation.
91. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (opinion also applies to
Rush, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)).
92. 436 U.S. at 92.
93. 444 U.S. at 332.
94. See Jay, supra note 25, at 450; Brilmayer, supra note 53, at 111.
95. 433 U.S. at 204.
96. See Brilmayer, supra note 53, at 111; Lewis, supra note 13, at 811.
97. For example, Justice Brennan's dissent in World-Wide and Rush demonstrates
this tendency to oversimplify the plaintiff's interest in securing a forum. Out of concern for
convenience to the plaintiff, Justice Brennan would relax the contacts requirements (and
presumably also jurisdictional guidelines geared to the defendant's reasonable expectations
or benefits) and would permit jurisdiction absent a "heavy and disproportionate burden" on
the defendant. 444 U.S. at 310 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 258-59 (Black, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Brennan noted that modern means of travel have eased a nonresident
defendant's burden of defending, see id. at 311, failing to mention that the same means
presumably would equally ease the plaintiff's burden of prosecuting.
98. See Brilmayer, supra note 53, at 107; Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multi-
State Problems: As Between State and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. Rv. 1315, 1322-23 (1981);
Lewis, supra note 8, at 733 n.182; Lewis, supra note 13, at 836; see also supra note 25. The
Court in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), exemplified this use of
the doctrine by stressing California's interest in providing the resident plaintiff a convenient
forum. Id. at 223.
99. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MICH. L. REv. 227, 227-28 (1967); Lewis, supra note 13, at 816 n.269.
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parties would have to travel;100 the parties' wealth; 101 the opportu-
nity costs of prosecuting or defending in a distant place; 0 2 and
countless other considerations clustered about the elusive concept
of an "undue burden"'03 on the defendant. A concern with simple
convenience would replace the current multifactor contacts analy-
sis with a vastly increased number of factors composing a compli-
cated, subjective inquiry that would lead to even less predictable
decisionmaking. Accordingly, just as the traditional insistence on
contacts assures something other than simple convenience for the
defendant,10 4 jurisdiction theory should not express the plaintiff's
interest in terms of his need for a convenient forum.10 5
A more limited liberalization of the contacts tests to take into
account the plaintiff's limited interest in avoiding fragmented liti-
gation would inject consideration of the plaintiff into the jurisdic-
tional analysis without subjecting courts to the approach just de-
scribed. The Court's recent decisions appear to recognize the
plaintiff's need to avoid fragmented litigation.' This more con-
fined, objectively ascertainable plaintiff's interest would avoid cer-
tain cases of extreme hardship even more effectively than an open-
ended interest in relative "convenience.' 0 7 If the plaintiff is able
to demonstrate a special, fragmentation-avoidance reason for liti-
gating in his forum of choice, it is hardly a radical proposition to
suggest that such an interest may offset a deficiency in the nature
or extent of the defendant's forum contacts. Even Pennoyer indi-
100. Whitten, supra note 25, at 846.
101. McDougal, supra note 6, at 9, 29-30.
102. Whitten, supra note 25, at 846. Professor Whitten specifically included as part of
his proposed inquiry consideration of travel necessities and the costs of living away from
home and of transporting evidence. Id.
103. McDougal, supra note 6, at 30.
104. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 712; infra text accompanying note 164.
105. Rejecting the characterization of the plaintiff's interest as "convenience" does not
constitute an argument for relegating plaintiffs to inconvenient fora. To the contrary, this
Article's proposals-limited liberalization of the contacts tests, explicit endorsement of most
of the satellite noncontacts-based particularized tests, and an ultimate direct resort to the
fairness criteria of expectation and benefit-combine to reduce the sets of circumstances
that would force plaintiffs to file suit in a manifestly inconvenient place.
106. See, e.g., World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 (noting "plaintiff's interest in convenient
and effective relief"); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (excepting jurisdiction by necessity from
the general minimum contacts framework).
107. For example, defining the plaintiff's interest as simply one of geographical conve-
nience ignores the plaintiff's fragmentation-avoidance interest. It is easy to imagine a situa-
tion in which one of several defendants is amenable to jurisdiction in plaintiff's home state




cates a concern for the ability of plaintiffs to prosecute their
claims.108 The Court has repeatedly at least acknowledged the rele-
vance of the plaintiff's jurisdictional interests,109 and in one case,
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., °10 the plaintiff's
interest in avoiding fragmented litigation seems to have been a de-
cisive factor supporting jurisdiction.""
Recognition of a plaintiff's fragmentation-avoidance interest
would sometimes lead to sustaining jurisdiction within the existing
minimum contacts framework. The result in Shaffer, for example,
might have been different if the Court had counted that interest." 2
On the other hand, the fragmentation-avoidance interest would
sometimes sustain jurisdiction apart from any particularized test,
under the overall criterion of expectation. For example, in an ac-
tion by a trustee for judicial settlement of the accounts of a com-
mon trust fund in which none of the many beneficiaries domiciled
outside the forum has purposeful forum contacts, jurisdiction in
the forum might rest on the plaintiff's interest in avoiding frag-
mented litigation in the beneficiaries' several home states."
B. Recognizing Contacts Occurring After the Claim Arises
Traditional minimum contacts analysis considers only the
"pre-litigation" or "historical" contacts that the defendant has
108. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 810.
109. In Kulko, World-Wide, and Rush, the Court acknowledged that assessing the
fairness of the forum to the defendant should proceed "in light of" forum selection interests
of the plaintiff. Ultimately, however, in each decision the Court found that the "primary"
consideration should be the defendant's interest in avoiding exercises of jurisdiction not
supported by contacts and that other interests, like the plaintiff's, were merely "relevant."
Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91-92; World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 (also applies to Rush); see supra text
accompanying notes 92-93.
110. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
111. As Justice Brennan later observed, the only articulated basis of jurisdiction in
Mullane was the interest of the forum state, since the defendants had not personally en-
tered into any discernible association with the forum. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 310 n.17
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 224 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). The interest of the plaintiff bank, however, actually appears to have been
even more important to the decision. See infra text accompanying notes 274-77. Although
commentators have described McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), as
turning on the plaintiff's general convenience interest, that description is inaccurate. The
defendant in McGee, unlike the defendants in Mullane, had entered into a purposeful asso-
ciation with the California forum, and thus satisfied the regular claim-related minimum con-
tacts tests without reference to the plaintiff's interest or that of the forum state. See Lewis,
supra note 13, at 792.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 280-83.
113. See infra part IV, section K.
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made with the forum,11 an approach that may have been a natural
consequence of sovereignty theory. Interstate sovereignty seems to
demand a formal basis of a state's authority to adjudicate at the
commencement of suit. Jurisdiction failed in Pennoyer, for exam-
ple, because the defendant acquired property within the fo-
rum-the theoretical basis of state power to adjudicate-only after
the action had commenced."1 5 If, however, the proper concern of
the personal jurisdiction decision is individual rights alone, and
not sovereign power, there is no a priori reason for courts to ignore
contacts occurring after the events that generated the claim."1" In-
deed, a relationship seems to exist between certain conduct of the
defendant after a lawsuit commences-for example, whether he as-
serts a claim to the property at issue in the case-and his reasona-
ble expectations about place of suit.117
A close inspection of the decisions since International Shoe
reveals that the Court occasionally has taken into account post-
litigation contacts. In Hanson, for example, the Court apparently
approved jurisdiction in the Delaware action even though the de-
fendants' only purposeful contacts with Delaware were their claims
in the litigation to trust assets located in the forum.118 Dictum in
Shaffer is even more pointed; the Court observed that when the
controversy concerns forum property, "the defendant's claim to
property located in the State would normally indicate that he ex-
pected to benefit from the State's protection of his interest."11 9 In
other words, the defendant's ownership of forum property becomes
114. See Drobak, supra note 25, at 1042 n.118, 1049-50, 1057-58; Comment, The
UCCJA: Coming of Age, 34 MERcER L. REV. 861, 870 (1983) (contacts analysis requires the
defendant's "previous connection" with the forum); see also Ireland, 456 U.S. at 704 ("his-
torical" contacts significant).
115. Lewis, supra note 8, at 703.
116. By contrast, questions of federal subject matter jurisdiction are principally con-
cerned with the allocation of power between competing state and federal systems. Thus, a
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction raised at the inception of an action suspends the
power of a federal court to inquire into other questions. Similarly, an assessment of facts
relevant to citizenship, on which diversity jurisdiction depends, properly considers only the
facts as of the commencement of the action. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 28
(4th ed. 1983).
117. Brilmayer, supra note 53 at 99 & nn.97-99; see Vernon, supra note 57, at 295-96;
Note, Uniform Approach, supra note 47, at 140.
118. Lewis, supra note 13, at 789-90 n.103.
119. 433 U.S. at 207-08 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); cf. Lehr v. Robertson,
103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983) (whether alleged biological father enjoys a liberty interest, protected
by due process, in receiving advance notice of adoption proceeding turns on whether he




a cognizable contact precisely because the defendant, after the on-
set of litigation, has responded to the complaint by claiming the
forum property as his own; the defendant should not be surprised
that he must defend that property in the state from which, as the
Court presumes, he should expect to receive some benefit. 20
Ireland is the best indication that the Court accepts the juris-
dictional significance of postlitigation contacts. In the majority's
view, personal jurisdiction may exist as a matter of law if a plain-
tiff demonstrates the ordinarily required "historical facts" about
defendant-forum contacts.' The Court went on to observe, how-
ever, that evidence of past contacts is "not the only way" to estab-
lish personal jurisdiction. 2 Instead, the majority accorded disposi-
tive jurisdictional significance to the defendants' actions after the
litigation had commenced. 2  This analysis is sound. Because the
contacts tests should function as predictors of expectation, they
should explicitly recognize that a defendant's forum contacts made
after the conduct that generates the claim sometimes may shed
light on the defendant's reasonable expectations about place of
suit.Y2 '
C. Recognizing An Unusually Slight Need of Any Particular
Defendant to Appear
Contacts analysis should also recognize that in some multiple
defendant lawsuits an individual defendant may not have the usual
need to appear in the action. Professor McDougal has suggested
the useful example of an action brought under Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act by a class of employees against a class of
employers, not all of whom have contacts with the forum. To Pro-
fessor McDougal this hypothetical raised the disturbing possibility
120. That the benefit in this example flows from the forum state, rather than from the
defendant's private commercial relations, does not render the benefit jurisdictionally irrele-
vant. Indeed, government-afforded benefit was the very kind considered significant in Inter-
national Shoe. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
121. 456 U.S. at 704.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 704-05. The critical conduct of the defendants in Ireland consisted of ob-
structing the progress of discovery about jurisdictional facts.
124. In fact, the Court already may have accepted the significance of forum contacts
that defendants make after the events that provoke a plaintiff's claim. For example, in Per-
kins v. Benguet, 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the claim-generating conduct of the defendant took
place in the Phillipines, before the onset of World War H. The Court, however, predicated
jurisdiction on the defendant's substantial activities in Ohio, the forum, and those took




of duplicative litigation in several states and a consequent burden
on the parties and on the "collective community of states." He
concluded that to "deny a class action ...because the plaintiff
class failed to demonstrate that all the . . .employers had mini-
mum contacts with the forum state would contravene the ... [col-
lective state] interest in resolving these controversies in a single
action."' 5 Therefore, he approved the result of a lower court deci-
sion 126 upholding jurisdiction, which accorded greater weight to the
various public interests reflected in class action statutes and rules
than to the standard minimum contacts protections.127 According
to Professor McDougal, this result is founded on the premise that
governmental interests warrant some compromise of the interests
of the parties. That premise, however, is no longer sound after the
recent Supreme Court decisions that elevate the interests of the
parties over any competing governmental interests. 28 In any event,
it is difficult to understand how policies in statutes and rules gov-
erning class actions may overcome the constitutional imperative of
protecting the interests of the parties.
129
A unified jurisdictional theory based on individual rights
yields fair results in these multiple defendant cases consistent with
current Supreme Court doctrine. Two party fairness features stand
out in these cases. First, the plaintiffs have a clear fragmentation-
avoidance interest in maintaining the action in their chosen forum.
Second, as long as at least one defendant from each defendant sub-
class appears in the action, no single defendant has the ordinarily
critical need to appear and defend because at least one important
defense will be common to all defendants. 30 Most individual fact
125. McDougal, supra note 6, at 25.
126. United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98 (D.D.C. 1976).
127. McDougal, supra note 6, at 24-25.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
129. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 726 (contending that Ireland is not satisfactorily ex-
plained as simply a decision promoting federal discovery rules over sovereignty interests
since it is "unlikely that a constitutional imperative would be shelved in favor of rules of
procedure").
130. By definition, defendants in a Rule 23 class action will share important common
defenses because under the Rule such an action would lie only if "there are questions of law
or fact common to the class," the "defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
...defenses of the class," and "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." Fn. R. Crv. P. 23(a).
Similarly, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court
explained why personal service upon each member of a class of defendant trust beneficiaries
was not essential to give the notice that procedural due process requires:
The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The
rights of each [defendant] in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee
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or law questions unique to particular defendants, even within a
unified subclass, would relate to individual relief and typically
would arise in a Title VII bifurcated trial only after an initial de-
termination of liability. s At the liability stage defendants who
clearly are subject to jurisdiction or who for other reasons volunta-
rily elect to appear and defend could represent the interests of the
absent defendants. Of course, in the second stage of the bifurcated
trial, each defendant previously found liable would admittedly
have the usual strong interest in appearing to present its individ-
ual defenses to relief. There is no reason in principle3 2 why these
defendants could not save their constitutional objections to juris-
diction until this second phase of the trial. The court then could
appraise this jurisdictional defense in light of the plaintiff's inter-
est in avoiding fragmented litigation. 3 ' This approach does less vi-
olence to the defendant's due process rights than does the substan-
tive interest approach, which all but sweeps those interests aside in
the name of judicial economy. At the same time, it allows a realis-
tic appraisal of the defendant's actual need to defend, balancing
that need against the plaintiff's special need to prosecute the ac-
tion in the forum.
A more difficult problem arises when multiple defendants do
not share essentially the same defenses to liability. In these
cases-World-Wide and other multidefendant tort actions are rep-
resentative-courts may not relax contacts strictures on the
ground that an individual defendant has an unusually slight need
to appear. World-Wide's solution to the problem is to remit plain-
tiffs to multiple suits in the several states that would have jurisdic-
tion over the various defendants. Of course, plaintiffs then could
face different approaches to the critical choice of law questions
that might dictate the outcome of the dispute. Understandably,
[plaintiff bank] are shared by many other [defendant] beneficiaries. Therefore notice
reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard
the interests of all, since any objections sustained would inure to the benefit of all.
Id. at 319.
131. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); J. FRIEDMAN & G.
STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 711 (1983).
132. Rules requiring the assertion of the personal jurisdiction defense before trial pre-
sent a practical obstacle to the effectiveness of the proposed procedure. See, e.g., FAD. R.
Civ. P. 12(g). Modification of these rules is necessary for multiple defendant cases so that
defendants can risk deferring the jurisdictional defense to the remedy stage of such a bifur-
cated proceeding.
133. See Comment, supra note 60, at 651-52, for a consideration of some of the
mechanics of weighing the interests of multiple defendants against the plaintiff's fragmenta-
tion-avoidance interest.
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this approach has evoked loud complaint from segments of the
trial bar134 and from Justice Brennan, who fairly characterized it as
reflecting an "extreme concern for defendants.'
135
The flaw in World-Wide, however, is not so much its over-
rating of the defendants' interests as its disregard of the fragmen-
tation-avoidance interests of the plaintiff. The Court evinces little
awareness that the defendant's interest in a fair forum is only one
consideration in a search for a forum relatively fair to both parties.
Relative fairness refers not just to the process that requires courts
to weigh the defendant's interests against the plaintiff's; it also
contemplates results that may be somewhat unfair to the defend-
ant, as they sometimes are to the plaintiff. 36
D. Blending Disparate Defendant's Contacts and Plaintiff's
Interests
Perhaps the most significant implication for contacts analysis
of an individual rights theory of personal jurisdiction organized
around uniform forum-fairness criteria is that an exercise of juris-
diction need not satisfy any single minimum contacts formula. The
decisions often have limited contacts analysis to the polar ex-
tremes, insisting that the defendant have either a forum contact
that is directly related to the plaintiff's claim3 7 or ongoing multi-
ple forum contacts that in the aggregate are regular and substan-
tial.""8 If, however, the sole justification for these tests is to enable
confident predictions about the fairness of the forum, by reference
to the criteria of expectation and benefit, it follows that jurisdic-
tion need not independently satisfy either of these polar extremes.
If the record suggests partial satisfaction of both versions of the
contacts tests, a court should be free to consider the strength of
the resulting inferences about expectation and benefit in making
its ultimate judgment about forum fairness.
Although the Court has not subscribed expressly to blending
claim-related and nonclaim-related contacts, its decisions certainly
do not foreclose that approach. For example, International Shoe
134. See, e.g., Kennelly, Choice of Laws, Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens,
1982 TmIAL LAW. GUIDE 260 (1982).
135. 444 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting in World-Wide and Rush).
136. The plaintiff faces the same unfairness when a forum perfectly convenient to the
defendant is found to offend due process for want of the requisite defendant-forum con-
tacts. See infra text accompanying notes 164-67.
137. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
138. E.g., Perkins v. Benguet, 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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did not suggest that satisfaction of any given contacts model is the
only way to demonstrate the requisite degree of expectation or
benefit for a fair exercise of jurisdiction. On the contrary, the opin-
ion discussed situations in which a defendant's several forum con-
tacts may not amount to regular, substantial, and continuous fo-
rum activity, but in which jurisdiction would still be appropriate
because some of those contacts are at least tangentially related to
the plaintiff's claim. 13 9 Perkins, consistent with International
Shoe's warning that the due process inquiry "cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative,' 4 0 announced that the "amount and
kind of activities which must be carried on by the [nonresident
defendant] in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable
and just to subject [the defendant] to the jurisdiction of that state
are to be determined in each case.' 4' Furthermore, the Court
stated in Shaffer that the "presence of the defendant's property in
a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defend-
ant, the State, and the litigation .... ,1.2 Finally, in Rush the
Court cited that statement in observing that a defendant's owner-
ship of forum property which the Court considered unrelated to
the cause of action was still a cognizable forum contact capable of
supporting jurisdiction under "the fairness standard of Interna-
tional Shoe' 14 3 when combined with other defendant-forum
contacts.
In practice, however, the Court's willingness to embrace a
blending of contacts has not been so evident. Shaffer would have
been an ideal case for adopting this feature of jurisdictional analy-
sis. Some degree of claim-relatedness surely was present: the injury
to the Delaware corporation from the alleged conduct of the
defendant fiduciaries would have had repercussions, at least to
some degree, 44 in the Delaware forum. Just as clearly, however,
139. It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do
not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has some-
times been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to pro-
cure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less. . . . Whether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity
in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose
of the due process clause to insure.
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
140. Id.
141. 342 U.S. at 445.
142. 433 U.S. at 209.
143. 444 U.S. at 328.
144. But see Ratner & Schwartz, The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner On the Substan-
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Shaffer's facts failed to display the close degree of relatedness re-
quired in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.14 5-the plain-
tiff's claim did not attack the defendants' management of corpo-
rate affairs in Delaware. Still, the defendants also had some
nonclaim-related forum contacts of the Perkins146 genre: the nu-
merous benefits and protections of Delaware law that they enjoyed
as officers or directors of a Delaware corporation. 14 7 These con-
tacts, however, evidently were not of sufficient magnitude to meet
independently the Court's conception of the Perkins test.148 Fi-
nally, the derivative action plaintiff in Shaffer had a substantial
fragmentation-avoidance interest in securing jurisdiction in Dela-
ware. Unless Delaware or some other state could have exercised
jurisdiction over all the defendants, the plaintiff would have had to
prosecute his claims in the several states with which the individual
defendants had constitutionally adequate contacts. Even in some
of those states jurisdiction might have failed without a basis for
jurisdiction over the corporation itself, since a corporation is an
indispensable party to shareholders' derivative actions.1 49 Facts
such as Shaffer's demand that contacts analysis be sufficiently
elastic to consider whether partial satisfaction of claim-related and
nonclaim-related tests of the defendant's contacts, coupled with
the plaintiff's interest in avoiding fragmented litigation, suffice to
make jurisdiction "fair" even though the defendant's contacts sat-
isfy neither polar test independently.
tive Law of Corporations, 45 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 641, 648-49 (1979) (arguing that there is
"very little real substance" to asserted concerns for "a victimized local corporation, a mani-
fest state regulatory interest, and an interest in supervising the affairs of its own creation").
145. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The McGee Court followed a strict, claim-relatedness con-
tacts approach. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
146. The Perkins Court utilized a typical, nonclaim-related contacts test. See supra
note 82 and accompanying text.
147. As Justice Brennan pointed out in dissent, Delaware law makes available to the
officials of its corporations a number of benefits, including interest free loans and indemnifi-
cation. 433 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority also acknowledged these ben-
efits and the plaintiff's argument that they should trigger a reciprocal obligation on the part
of the defendants to respond in Delaware to claims that they had abused their corporate
offices. 433 U.S. at 215-16.
148. Without specifically addressing whether the regularity and quantum of these ben-
efits sufficed for jurisdiction on the Perkins basis of regular, substantial, and continuous
nonclaim-related activities, the Court observed that because Delaware had not enacted a
statute deeming acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction, the defendants "had
no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court" in connection with their non-
Delaware activities. 433 U.S. at 216.




While critics may object that this blending approach calls for
an ultimate judgment on forum fairness that is beyond the capabil-
ities of a court, the court's task would be really no more difficult
than evaluating forum fairness under either polar test alone. A
claim-related test demands that the court assess the degree to
which the defendant's alleged conduct relates to or has an effect in
the forum. Worse yet, World- Wide's incremental refinement of the
relatedness test requires the court to decide whether a defendant's
forum contacts have afforded him a nontrivial benefit in a noncol-
lateral way.150 The Court furnishes no standards for determining
when a benefit is too marginal or arises from a relation too collat-
eral to the defendant's forum contact to support jurisdiction. Simi-
larly, no clear criteria define how substantial, regular, or continu-
ous a defendant's nonclaim-related contacts must be to satisfy the
test of Perkins.51
In short, judges already face the unenviable task of pinning
down the ever-elusive phantom of forum fairness. That task un-
avoidably requires judges to quantify and to weigh several specula-
tive and possibly unmeasurable considerations. To avoid compli-
cating that task unduly, jurisdictional analysis should include only
factors that strongly correlate with the goal of forum fairness. Ex-
traneous factors such as governmental interests, while undeniably
important on such issues as choice of law, bear no logical relation
to the fairness criteria that alone should control questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction.1 52 Therefore, these extraneous considerations
should play no role in the jurisdiction decision. Equally important,
however, the jurisdictional equation must include all considera-
tions that do yield the relevant correlations with expectation and
benefit, even at the price of further speculation and measurement.
Accordingly, courts should consider as a whole the blend of a de-
fendant's claim-related and nonclaim-related contacts in reaching
a conclusion about the defendant's expectation and benefit-the
150. 444 U.S. at 299; see Lewis, supra note 13, at 803-04.
151. Indeed, the Court may have avoided deciding whether the Perkins basis was
independently satisfied in Shaffer precisely because the concept of substantiality is so
largely undefined. In International Shoe, the Court assessed the magnitude of the defend-
ant's forum dealings in terms of its aggregate sales volume generated from forum activities.
In Perkins, by contrast, the defendants conducted no or virtually no profit-generating activ-
ity at the relevant times; nevertheless, the Court found the defendant's forum activities
substantial under a proportionate measure of substantiality represented by the percentage
of defendant's overall activities carried on in the forum. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 782-83
n.73.
152. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 735-36.
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ultimate criteria of fairness to the parties-tempered also by the
plaintiff's interest in avoiding fragmented litigation.
IV. VALIDITY OF THE "SATELLITE" JURISDICTIONAL TESTS NOT
BASED ON CONTACTS
Three possible fates await each of the satellite jurisdictional
tests not based on contacts. Some may warrant continued recogni-
tion because they are consistent with the liberalized, reformulated
contacts tests proposed in part III of this Article. Other tests fall-
ing outside the contacts mainstream may survive due process scru-
tiny if they confidently can predict satisfaction of one of the ulti-
mate fairness criteria of expectation or benefit. Finally,
jurisdictional analysis should discard any satellite tests that cannot
be squared either with the modified minimum contacts tests or
with the ultimate fairness criteria.
A. The "Noncommercial Tortfeasor"
After Hanson and World-Wide, the class of cases involving
"noncommercial tortfeasor" defendants analytically is a satellite
area outside the developed minimum contacts framework alto-
gether. Quite simply, the factual situations do not lend themselves
to a contacts approach. These defendants have made no purposeful
forum contact, or their isolated forum contact has yielded them no
commercial benefit. For example, assume that B, a resident and
domiciliary of New York, stands in New York and, without knowl-
edge of his proximity to New Jersey, fires a gun at a target in New
York. A bullet discharged from this round enters New Jersey,
where it strikes and injures A, a resident and domiciliary of that
state. 158 Assume further that B has no other New Jersey contacts,
claim-related or otherwise. B's sole interaction with New Jersey is
neither beneficial to him nor even advertent. Traditional minimum
contacts analysis, at least after World-Wide, would preclude New
Jersey from asserting jurisdiction over B. Although B's conduct
produced, perhaps foreseeably, an effect in New Jersey, his con-
duct is not a purposeful or beneficial contact with that state.1"
Even the proposed minimum contacts modification that relates to
the plaintiff's interests15  would not change the result, since A has
153. A discussion of a similar hypothetical appears in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 caveat a (1971).
154. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298-99.
155. None of the other modifications suggested in part III has any application to this
[Vol. 37:1
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
an alternative forum available (New York, B's state of domicile)
and he faces no threat of fragmented litigation.
156
The Supreme Court recently appeared to endorse an expecta-
tions approach for assessing the constitutionality of personal juris-
diction over tortfeasors who cause effects in the forum by entirely
noncommercial acts committed elsewhere. The relevant question,
the Court wrote, is whether the defendant should have expected to
be "haled before" a court of the forum state.157 In context, the
Court clearly implied that contacts which hold no promise of bene-
fit might nevertheless suffice to render an exercise of jurisdiction
fair to the defendant so long as they generate expectations about
the place of suit.15 Thus, the bullet hypothetical may be resolved
by immediate reference to the fairness criterion of expectation, de-
spite defendant B's lack of purposeful and beneficial forum
contacts.
Still, on the necessary assumption5 9 that B should have ex-
pected suit somewhere, it would be quite a stretch to subject him
to jurisdiction in New Jersey. He cannot fairly be held to any "in-
trinsically" generated expectations about suit in New Jersey, for he
is oblivious (perhaps with the characteristic noblesse oblige of a
New Yorker) to his proximity to the border. Nor does the evidence
point to any "extrinsic" factors-a contractual agreement to sub-
mit to New Jersey's jurisdiction or a long-arm statute of which he
is likely to be aware-that should have warned him that New
situation.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 87-113.
157. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
158. The Court's consideration of expectation as an independently sufficient rationale
for jurisdiction in the noncommercial tortfeasor situation comes as a curious aside in Kulko,
a domestic relations case. The Court introduced the expectations rationale for noncommeri-
cal tortfeasor cases by citing § 37 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, which
generally authorizes states to assert jurisdiction "over an individual who causes effects in
the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these
effects. . . ." 436 U.S. at 96. The Court referred specifically to the Restaters' example of a
defendant's "shooting [a] bullet from one State into another." Id. The Court stated that
when a defendant's wrongful acts outside the forum cause injury within it, the test of juris-
diction is whether, given the nature of the defendant's out-of-state act, a reasonable person
in his position should have expected to be "haled before" a court of the forum. Id. at 96, 97-
98 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). Later the Court in World-Wide
appeared to embrace the same expectations rationale as the ultimate justification not just
for tort cases but for any exercise of jurisdiction formally predicated on a test of contacts.
444 U.S. at 297. In Calder, No. 82-1401 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984) (available Mar. 22, 1984 on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Sup file), the Court again approved jurisdiction based on the "ef-
fects" that a defendant's out-of-state acts produce in the forum, relying explicitly on § 37.
159. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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Jersey might be the forum. True, many observers would say that
jurisdiction in New Jersey, in a rough sense, would be minimally
"fair" without regard to expectation since, if one of the parties will
have to cross state lines to participate in the lawsuit, it should be
the affirmative actor rather than the passive victim.16 0 The hypoth-
esized facts are unusual, though, and it would do little damage to
substantive fairness in the aggregate to deny jurisdiction in that
situation and insist on adherence to the ultimate criteria of fair-
ness. New Jersey's jurisdiction on the hypothetical facts should
therefore be denied. If, however, as would more often be the case,
the defendant were aware of his proximity to the border, jurisidic-
tion should be upheld on a rationale of intrinsically generated ex-
pectations: B's knowledge that he is acting near the border should
lead a reasonable person in his position to expect that the conse-
quences of his conduct may be felt in that state and, therefore, to
expect that if those consequences provoke a lawsuit, he may have
to defend it there.
B. "Proximity" or "Convenience"
On rare occasions, although the foreign forum is one with
which the defendant has no "contacts, ties, or relations,""1 ' it is
also the single most convenient place for the defendant to litigate.
Some commentators have contended that in such cases the foreign
forum's proximity to the defendant arguably serves as an alterna-
tive basis of personal jurisdiction. 62 Expectation or benefit analy-
sis would enable a court to assess whether jurisdiction based on
proximity satisfies due process.
Consider a New Jersey plaintiff who files suit in New Jersey
after being injured in an accident in New York with a defendant
who is a New York resident and domiciliary. The defendant has no
contacts with New Jersey, but the New Jersey courthouse is closest
to his residence and thus more convenient to him than any in New
York. The forum's attempted exercise of jurisdiction would fall if
traditional minimum contacts tests exhaust the categories of "fair
play," since the defendant has no contacts with New Jersey that
would satisfy the requirements expounded in the Court's most re-
cent decisions."' World-Wide made it abundantly clear that rela-
160. The Court in Kulko expressly relied on this "who has gone to whom" factor as
relevant to the defendant's expectations about place of suit. 436 U.S. at 97-98.
161. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
162. See Whitten, supra note 25, at 846; McDougal, supra note 6, at 9, 29-30.
163. Professor Posnak posed this hypothetical and concluded that a court should
[Vol. 37:1
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
tive convenience to the defendant does not equate with and may
not substitute for contacts.1 4 In addition, Rush instructed that the
relevant forum contacts are the contacts of each defendant, rather
than the aggregated contacts of defendants and plaintiffs. 
1 5
Under an approach that bypasses contacts and proceeds di-
rectly to fairness criteria, jurisdiction theoretically might be proper
in this hypothetical if the evidence warrants a conclusion about the
defendant's expectations of suit that comports with the broader
"standards" of International Shoe. In application, however, the
analysis still would not point to New Jersey as a fair forum be-
cause either of two opposing expectations is equally imputable to
the defendant. First, he reasonably might expect to defend only in
his home state of New York, particularly when he has not purpose-
fully initiated any contacts with New Jersey. Alternatively, the de-
fendant reasonably might expect to defend in the court closest to
his residence, a New Jersey court, even though he has had no tra-
ditionally cognizable connection with that state. Each of these ex-
pectations is a priori as reasonable as the other. Given opposing
expectations of relatively equal strength, the court should not arbi-
trarily hold the defendant to one expectation rather than the
other. Accordingly, on these facts direct resort to an expectation
rationale does not support jurisdiction any more than do the stan-
dard tests of contacts.
This denial of jurisdiction and the broader denial of proximity
as a satellite jurisdictional basis is probably the most prudent, if
not the most fair, result. Departing from the uniform jurisdictional
guidelines would sacrifice efficiency and countervailing fairness val-
ues. Moreover, the plaintiff has another available forum-the de-
fendant's state of domicile-adjacent to the plaintiff's home state
and hence not seriously inconvenient to him. Accordingly, this
plaintiff would rarely even try to avoid filing suit in the defend-
ant's state of domicile, particularly since under World- Wide's
tightened contacts tests his attempt to secure jurisdiction at home
probably would prove unavailing. Although raw fairness or conve-
grant a timely motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because the defendant has
no "judicially cognizable ties" with New Jersey in the sense that World-Wide intended. New
Jersey therefore should defer to New York in order to promote interstate federalism. Pos-
nak, supra note 47, at 780; see e.g., McDougal, supra note 6, at 8-9; R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRm
& H. KAY, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 513 (2d ed. 1975).
164. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 712; see also Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the
Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 22, 35 (1982-83).
165. See supra text accompanying note 65.
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nience, instead of their surrogates of expectation and benefit,
might point to jurisdiction in the plaintiff's preferred forum as the
most "just" result,l"' the need for a more objective rule 67 and the
absence of significant prejudice to the plaintiff support a denial of
jurisdiction.
C. Voluntary, Express Consent
Expectation analysis also supports voluntary, express consent
as an alternative, noncontacts basis of jurisdiction. The paradigm
example of such consent is a forum selection clause. Assume that
B, a sophisticated, wealthy Florida domiciliary represented by
skillful counsel, enters into a contract negotiated, executed, and to
be performed entirely in Florida, with A, a New York corporation.
Assume also that neither B nor A has any contacts whatsoever
with Nebraska, but that the contract stipulates that Nebraska will
be the forum for all contract-related litigation. If B breaches the
contract and A files suit in Nebraska, traditional minimum con-
tacts analysis would not approve jurisdiction because the defend-
ant has no Nebraska contacts apart from the mention of Nebraska
in the agreement. That lone contact would fail to support jurisdic-
tion because the claim would relate not to the defendant's refer-
ence to Nebraska in the contract, but to his alleged acts of breach
in Florida.
The proposed expectation bypass analysis, however, supports
jurisdiction in this situation. The Supreme Court reconfirmed in
Ireland that "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit
to the jurisdiction of a given court."1 8 Still, inclusion of a forum
selection clause in the parties' agreement should not obviate a fair-
ness determination altogether. The parties' characteristics or con-
duct might indicate that the forum is substantively unfair, or that
the defendant actually did not understand that the supposedly
"agreed upon" forum was part of his agreement.169 Instead, the ap-
166. Some jurists and writers remain committed to the superficially appealing concept
that a court may assess fairness in terms of raw convenience to the parties. See supra 97-
102 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
168. 456 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1982) (citing National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S.
311, 316 (1964)); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
169. In D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), the Supreme Court
cautioned that a forum selection clause might not support jurisdiction independent of mini-
mum contacts if the "contract is one of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargain-
ing power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the [forum selection clause]." Id. at
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propriate analysis for fairness is the same as for other extrinsically
generated expectations. First, the defendant must have notice that
jurisdiction may lie in a forum with which he has negligible con-
tacts. This element is present in our hypothetical because the con-
tract expressly designates a particular forum for all contract-re-
lated litigation. In other cases, however, when the defendant is
relatively unsophisticated, a forum selection clause, even if read,
may fail to generate a reasonable expectation that litigation over
the contract may take place in the forum.170 Second, the defend-
ant's consent must be voluntary. This element, too, usually should
present no problem because the defendant's decision to submit to
the forum selection clause ordinarily would not cause him to forfeit
a preexisting constitutional right to engage in the transaction con-
templated by the contract.1 71 Thus, an analysis of the defendant's
extrinsically generated expectations justifies in general fairness
terms what until now has been a distinct exception to the mini-
mum contacts tests.
D. Quasi-Voluntary Consent
Some state statutes provide that a nonresident who engages in
certain forum-related conduct is deemed to have consented to the
jurisdiction of the state's courts for resolving claims arising from
that conduct.172 These statutes, unlike the bargained-for contrac-
tual forum selection clauses, at best represent a form of implied,
rather than actual, consent and create only an uncertain possibility
of notice to a given nonresident that his conduct may subject him
to a forum's jurisdiction. Such statutes-the nonresident motorist
statutes are again an example-cannot provide a basis of jurisdic-
tion under the traditional analysis since by themselves they cannot
supply a purposeful or beneficial defendant-forum contact when
one is otherwise absent. That a statute cannot make contacts pur-
188.
170. In National Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), Justice Black ex-
pressed concern that a cleverly drafted forum consent clause that appears only to appoint
an agent for service may force an unsuspecting, unsophisticated party into costly litigation.
Id. at 326-27 (Black, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Overmyer the Court considered the sophis-
tication of the parties when it acknowledged that Overmyer "has been party to 'tens of
thousands of contracts with many contractors.'" 405 U.S. at 186.
171. Voluntariness for these purposes means that the defendant could have chosen to
withhold the consent without sacrificing a preexisting constitutional right. See supra text
accompanying note 79.
172. A collection of these long-arm statutes appears in R. CASAD, JURISDICION IN CIVIL
ACOrONs A-32-102 app. (1983).
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poseful or beneficial holds true even if the statute evinces a strong
state interest in asserting jurisdiction, because Rush has made
clear that state interests may not substitute for defendant-forum
contacts.
Nevertheless, statutory notice to certain defendants of poten-
tial litigation within the forum arising from their forum-related
conduct sometimes may provide a basis of jurisdiction founded on
expectations instead of contacts. The statute may extrinsically
generate an expectation in relatively sophisticated primary actors
that they must defend in the forum any litigation arising from
their activities covered by the statute. The Supreme Court in
Shaffer appeared to approve this proposed expectation approach
as an alternative to the minimum contacts analysis. The opinion
asserted that even if Delaware had expressed a manifest state in-
terest in asserting jurisdiction over the corporate fiduciaries, 173 ju-
risdiction still would not have been "fair," since the plaintiff's
claim did not arise out of the defendant's forum contacts as di-
rectly as the Court thought the minimum contacts "nexus" test re-
quired. 17 4 The Court proceeded to state, however, that one reason
the defendants should not have expected to be "haled before the
Delaware court" was that Delaware had not enacted a separate
statute that would treat acceptance of a corporate directorship as
consent to jurisdiction.1 7 5 Thus, the Court apparently considered
quasi-voluntary consent as a distinct alternative to minimum con-
tacts-the latter founded on the familiar defendant-forum-litiga-
tion contacts, the former founded on a statute that generates an
expectation on the part of the defendant that he must conduct his
defense in the forum.
7 6
Within weeks after the Shaffer decision, the Delaware legisla-
ture passed precisely such an expectation-generating statute. It
provided that a nonresident's acceptance of or continued service in
a directorship of a Delaware-chartered corporation amounts to
consent to suit in Delaware for claims arising from his corporate
conduct. 77 The Delaware Supreme Court, on jurisdictional facts
173. The Court concluded that Delaware's sequestration statute failed to express such
an interest, since it reached only defendants who happened to own property within the fo-
rum, and Delaware law did not require corporate fiduciaries to purchase shares in their
corporations. 433 U.S. at 213-14.
174. Id. at 215-16.
175. Id. at 216; cf. id. at 227 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
176. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 798 n.158.




similar to Shaffer's, later upheld jurisdiction but eschewed Shaf-
fer's "consent" theory and relied instead on the statute's expres-
sion of Delaware's interest in asserting jurisdiction over the
corporate fiduciaries.' 7  After Rush, however, forum state interests
are no longer legitimate elements in the personal jurisdiction equa-
tion. Nevertheless, the expectations rationale that Shaffer fore-
shadowed would have enabled the same result in party fairness
terms.
An expectation-generating statute like Delaware's should pass
muster as a means for a forum to assert jurisdiction over a defend-
ant regardless of that defendant's contacts with the forum. The
prospective defendants are relatively sophisticated and most likely
rely on the advice of counsel in deciding to affiliate with the corpo-
ration. It would not be unfair, then, for a court to assume that they
in fact received statutory notice and, accordingly, to construe their
acceptance of a directorship as a limited consent to jurisdiction in
accordance with the statute's terms. Further, this consent would be
voluntary: a would-be director could avoid the jurisdictional conse-
quences by declining the directorship. In declining he would not
forfeit a preexisting constitutional right; he would forfeit only
(a) Every nonresident of this state who after September 1, 1977, accepts election or
appointment as a director, trustee or member of the governing body of a corporation
organized under the laws of this State or who after June 30, 1978, serves in such capac-
ity and every resident of this State who so accepts election or appointment or serves in
such capacity and thereafter removes his residence from this State shall, by such ac-
ceptance or by such service, be deemed thereby to have consented to the appointment
of the registered agent of such corporation (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State)
as his agent upon whom service of process may be made in all civil actions or proceed-
ings brought in this State, by or on behalf of, or against such corporation, in which
such director, trustee or member is a necessary or proper party, or in any action or
proceeding against such director, trustee or member for violation of his duty in such
capacity, whether or not he continues to serve as such director, trustee or member at
the time suit is commenced. Such acceptance or service as such director, trustee or
member shall be a signification of the consent of such director, trustee or member that
any process when so served shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served
upon such director, trustee or member within this State and such appointment of the
registered agent (or, if there is none, the Secretary of State) shall be irrevocable.
178. See Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d 174, 180 (Del. 1980). "The only substan-
tive difference for present purposes between Shaffer and the instant case is the existence of
§ 3114 as the basis for jurisdiction; we think that is sufficient to render the assertion of in
personam jurisdiction constitutional in this case." Id.
North Carolina has a similar "consent" statute for corporate directors. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-33 (1982) (enacted 1955). In a post-Shaffer decision a North Carolina appeals
court, like the Delaware Supreme Court, upheld jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate
director largely because of the state's statutorily expressed jurisdictional interest. See Swen-
son v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 92, 250 S.E.2d 279, 290 (1978), appeal dismissed, 296 N.C.
740, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1979).
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those special benefits and protections that Delaware law provides
directors of Delaware corporations."'
This "consent" process is also a substantively fair trade-off of
burdens and benefits. The forum's benefits to corporate directors
justify burdening them with the reciprocal obligation of defending
in the forum all claims related to their corporate duties.180 Thus,
this "consent" basis is theoretically even stronger than the pure
expectation rationale underlying jurisdiction for express contrac-
tual consent. Under the implied or quasi-voluntary consent theory,
the fairness of subjecting the defendant to suit rests not only on
his presumed expectations but also on the benefits he accepted
from the forum despite statutory warning about the consequences
of accepting them.181
E. Waiver
Cases concerning a defendant's "waiver" of the personal juris-
diction defense further illustrate the flexibility of the expectation
criterion. For instance, in Ireland' the Court found a waiver of
the personal jurisdiction defense in the defendants' repeated fail-
ure to comply with discovery orders to produce information rele-
vant to the personal jurisdiction issue. To implement this
waiver-or perhaps as an alternative rationale for upholding juris-
diction-the Court presumed the existence of constitutionally ade-
quate minimum contacts as a sanction for the defendants' recalci-
trant conduct. 183 Thus, the Court has found personal jurisdiction
based on waiver to fall within the broad "standards" of Interna-
tional Shoe, even absent a showing of a defendant-forum relation-
ship sufficient to satisfy a traditional test of minimum contacts.
The specific International Shoe standard that supports the
179. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that the benefits conferred on the directors
of Delaware corporations include "the power to manage the business and affairs of the cor-
poration [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a)], the opportunity to receive interest-free unsecured
loans from the corporation [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143] and the opportunity to receive
indemnification in actions against them by reason of the fact that they are directors [DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145]." Armstrong v. Pomerance, 423 A.2d at 176 n.4 (bracketed matter in
original).
180. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 798-99.
181. This melding of expectations and benefits is analogous to the blending of claim-
related and nonclaim-related contacts proposed supra in part III, section D.
182. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982).
183. Id. at 706. Similarly, the Court in Ireland reaffirmed the validity of procedural
rules declaring that a defendant waives his personal jurisdiction defense if he fails to raise it
in a timely fashion. Id. at 190.
[Vol. 37:1
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Ireland holding is expectation. Ireland's foreign defendants, once
served with process, had two options. First, they could have ig-
nored the proceeding in the forum, risked a default judgment, and
collaterally challenged the judgment for lack of jurisdiction if the
plaintiff sought enforcement.184 Alternatively, the defendants could
have submitted to the court's authority for the limited purpose of
challenging jurisdiction. Because the Ireland defendants opted to
appear, expectations analysis may fairly impute to them an under-
standing of the discovery requirements and the sanctions for diso-
bedience l s" of the judicial system to which they submitted. Thus,
after frustrating the court's determination of the jurisdictional
question, the defendants reasonably should have expected the
court to invoke *one of the sanctions designated by the Federal
Rules.
F. Domicile
A well-established principle of jurisdiction is that the state of
domicile of a nonresident, unconsenting defendant, not served with
process within the forum, may exercise personal jurisdiction over
that defendant on any claim, without regard to contacts, on the
basis of domicile alone. 1 8 The most common version of domicile is
184. See R. FImLD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVL
PROCEDURE 729-30 (4th ed. 1978).
185. One available sanction for a failure to comply with discovery orders is that "[a]n
order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts
shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim
of the party obtaining the order." FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
Expectation analysis also provides a realistic way to explain the waiver doctrine that
subjects a nonresident plaintiff to jurisdiction on a compulsory counterclaim. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 13(a). A reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff should expect to have to
defend in the forum those claims of the defendant that are closely related to the claims the
plaintiff himself has chosen to prosecute there. This reasoning, however, does not extend to
permissive counterclaims, which by definition do not arise out of the same factual nucleus as
the plaintiff's claim. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b). Therefore, subjecting the plaintiff to jurisdic-
tion on a consent theory, as in Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938), is suspect to the extent
that it treats the plaintiff as having voluntarily submitted to permissive counterclaims.
To some degree the fairness criterion of benefit fortifies this expectation basis of juris-
diction over compulsory counterclaims. The plaintiff's invocation of the benefits of the fo-
rum's judicial process to prosecute his claim should carry with it an obligation to submit to
at least those counterclaims that are closely related to the plaintiff's claim. See id.; RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 9 (1980). This application of the benefits rationale, however,
has its limits. It seems inapplicable when the relief sought in the counterclaim is much
greater than that requested in the plaintiff's main claim. The lesser forum benefits and
protections that the plaintiff invokes in his claim would not justify extracting from him a
reciprocal obligation to submit to claims of far greater magnitude.
186. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). Milliken confirmed similar dictum in
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"domicile of choice, '' 187 typically defined in a "technical"188 fashion
to require the concurrence of the defendant's physical presence in
the forum and his intent to make that place his home.189 The ra-
tionale for this single factor basis of jurisdiction is that a state af-
fording privileges and protection to a defendant and to his prop-
erty may exact reciprocal duties "by virtue of his domicile."110
Under this technical definition, however, an absent defendant may
not have received any substantial privileges or protection from the
forum, or may have received them too long ago for jurisdiction to
be fair. In other words, technical domicile as a jurisdictional basis
is too broad because it permits jurisdiction over foreign defendants
without adequate indicia of expectation or benefit. For example, a
Texas domiciliary, long absent from Texas and now living and per-
forming military duties in Florida, might have to defend any claim
asserted against him in Texas, despite an absence of any indication
that he should expect to defend in Texas and despite Texas' fail-
ure to furnish him any recent benefits. e"
If domicile is to survive as a single factor basis of jurisdiction
under general standards of fairness, the concept must be redefined
to reflect more particularly the defendant's benefits and expecta-
tions about place of suit. The revised definition should measure
the defendant's current or recent physical, economic, and social
connections with the forum against his similar connections with
other states.192 If the defendant's aggregate connections with the
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15 (1971).
188. See Vernon, supra note 57, at 301 & n.128.
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15, 16, 18 (1971).
190. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463.
191. Professor Vernon considers assertions of jurisdiction based only on a technical
domicile theory "unjust." He argues that after Shaffer exercises of jurisdiction based on
domicile alone will meet constitutional standards only for claims related to the status of
domicile. Vernon, supra note 57, at 300-01. This restriction raises the question whether
domicile should remain a separate jurisdictional basis at all, since jurisdiction in most cases
to which Professor Vernon would limit domicile also would be valid under the claim-related
form of minimum contacts.
192. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS suggests several factors for de-
termining whether jurisdiction exists on the basis of residence that might be relevant to a
revised definition of domicile. These factors include the amount of time the individual
spends in the state, the nature of his place of abode there, and the full range of his recent
activities in or affecting the state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 30 com-
ment a (1971).
Residence may provide a more workable jurisdictional standard than domicile because
it "does not require the existence of an attitude of mind similar to that required for the
acquisition of a domicile of choice." Id. Among the considerations in determining residence,
the Restaters list a different kind of "attitude of mind toward the state," namely, whether
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forum are more meaningful than his connections with any other
state, a court reasonably could impute to the defendant an expec-
tation that he may have to defend any civil claim in the forum.
Although this analysis would not support jurisdiction whenever the
defendant is a technical domiciliary of the forum, it usually "93
would afford plaintiffs at least one forum other than the state in
which the claim arose.
Because courts under the revised domicile approach must con-
sider so many factors in reaching ultimate conclusions about domi-
cile and, hence, expectation and benefit, this redefined domicile
concept might lose some appeal as a satellite basis of jurisdiction.
Most certainly, efficiency would not characterize the revised domi-
cile test as it does most single factor tests. Instead, courts might as
well measure expectation and benefit directly, bypassing all partic-
ularized tests. In any event, as long as the focus of jurisdictional
analysis is ascertaining the fairness of a forum, courts should not
continue to recognize the current technically defined concept of
domicile as a single factor jurisdictional test.
G. State of Incorporation
Under traditional theory the state of incorporation, like the
state of domicile for a natural person, may exercise personal juris-
diction over a corporation for any claims asserted against the cor-
poration in the chartering state. 94 The principal rationale behind
this noncontacts jurisdictional basis, however, is flawed; the satel-
lite test focusing on state of incorporation derives from the notion
that such a test is fair because the chartering state "created" the
corporation,195 when a corporation is really a creation of its initial
organizers, who voluntarily incorporate in the state of their
the defendant currently "regards it with affection and as a place to which he likes to go
whenever possible." Id. This inquiry seems more manageable than the state of mind ele-
ment of the domicile test, which requires an assessment of the defendant's intention to
make a state his home for the indefinite future. Id. § 18.
193. Of course, if the claim arises in the state of the defendant's domicile, the single
factor domicile basis adds nothing to the jurisdiction afforded under a claim-related test of
contacts. Nor would the domicile basis assist in deciding whether the forum has jurisdiction
over a perpetual drifter whose connections with any state are so insubstantial that any sug-
gestion that his marginally greater contacts with one state are jurisdictionally significant
would be misleading.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 comment b (1971); R. CASAD,
supra note 172, at 3-64.
195. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735. An alternative rationale, that the "domestic corpora-
tion can be seen as analogous to an individual domiciliary," R. CASAD, supra note 172, at 2-
16, simply begs the question of the fairness of jurisdiction based on domicile.
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choice.198 As an alternative justification, contacts theory is as inad-
equate as the abstract "creation" theory. State of incorporation is
an independently useful basis of jurisdiction only when constitu-
tionally adequate contacts are lacking.1 1  Thus, if state of incorpo-
ration is to continue as a single factor basis of jurisdiction, a ra-
tionale not based on contacts is necessary to explain why
jurisdiction on that basis is fair to the corporation.
The proposed expectation and benefit bypass approach pro-
vides a much more persuasive justification for the state of incorpo-
ration jurisdictional basis. Corporate managers should expect to
defend suits in the state of incorporation, even if the claims arise
elsewhere. The chartering state's statutes that invariably provide
for jurisdiction over domestic corporations9 8 are the sources of
these extrinsically generated expectations. 9 9 Moreover, giving
weight to these expectations is fair because the act of incorporation
is voluntary. 00 Similarly, corporate organizers might decide to in-
corporate in a certain state because they anticipate more favorable
treatment-that is, benefit-from the laws, courts, and govern-
ment of that state than from others.20 1 Although the benefits of
incorporation in a state may not meet the Perkins criteria of con-
tinuity and substantiality, when the incorporators select the state
of incorporation and the successor managers continue doing busi-
ness under that state's charter, they invoke these benefits in an
especially purposeful and deliberate manner. On balance, there-
196. Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 144, at 649.
197. The Perkins rationale, for example, could not support jurisdiction if the corpora-
tion's only current activity in the chartering state consists of maintaining its corporate sta-
tus. Even though a corporation maintains at least a limited continual contact with the char-
tering state by periodically filing corporate reports and reincorporation documents, these
contacts are not substantial either in aggregate dollar terms or in proportion to the com-
pany's business operations. See supra note 151.
198. See R. CASAD, supra note 172, at 3-64.
199. Compared to the defendant in a typical tort or domestic relations action, incorpo-
rators presumably are knowledgeable about the legal consequences of their business con-
duct. If it is true, as contended in part II of this Article, that an individual prospective
officer or director will be aware of a director consent statute, then it seems at least as likely
that incorporators will be aware of the jurisdictional consequences of incorporating in the
forum.
200. Voluntary in this sense means that the act of incorporation conferred no benefits
to which the defendants were already constitutionally entitled. See supra text accompany-
ing note 79.
201. Indeed, the managers retain the option of changing their state of incorporation if
they become dissatisfied with the laws or government of their chartering state. Ratner &
Schwartz, supra note 144, at 653. The managers of Greyhound Corporation actually exer-
cised this option in response to the enactment of Delaware's director-consent statute in the
wake of Shaffer. Id. at 649 n.46, 653-54.
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fore, the extrinsically generated expectations flowing from the fo-
rum's jurisdictional statutes, coupled with the purposefully in-
voked benefits associated with selecting the forum as the
chartering state, justify retaining state of incorporation as a single
factor basis of jurisdiction.
H. Divorce
When faced with questions of family status, the Supreme
Court customarily has eschewed its primary jurisdiction theories in
favor of "doctrines peculiar to domestic relations law. '202 The
Court initially based its relaxation of the customary defendant-
centered jurisdictional approach in divorce cases on the theory
that a divorce proceeding determined interests in a "res" -the
marital status.20 3 Thus, regardless of the parties' other forum con-
nections, jurisdiction existed where that "res" was deemed lo-
cated-at first, only in the state of the couple's marital domicile;
later, in the defendant's state of domicile as well.204 In Williams v.
North Carolina (Williams 1)205 the Court declined to rely on the
artificial distinctions between in rem and in personam actions but,
relying instead on the forum state's interest in the status of its
domiciliaries, further expanded the permissible locus of suit to in-
clude the state of domicile of the plaintiff208 Even with the forum
state interest doctrine in decline,0 7 and even though the status ba-
ses operate outside the minimum contacts rubric and thus some-
times uphold jurisdiction when the defendant has no discernible
connection with the forum, the Court in Shaffer declined to con-
demn jurisdiction based on status as repugnant to fair play.208
202. D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD & C. TArr, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 379 (5th
ed. 1983).
203. R. CASAD, supra note 172, at 2-14; Posnak, supra note 47, at 734 n.24; Develop-
ments in the Law, State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 969 (1960).
204. Developments in the Law, State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 203, at 967.
205. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
206. Id. at 298-99. Based on this holding, one commentator has concluded that "per-
sonal jurisdiction of the defendant is unnecessary. Domicile of the plaintiff in a divorce
action is a basis, not for personal jurisdiction, but for jurisdiction of the subject matter." R.
CASAD, supra note 172, at 9-13.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 26-35 and infra text accompanying note 209.
208. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30; see supra text accompanying note 41. Recent state court
decisions have followed expressly the suggestion in the Shaffer footnote that assertions of
jurisdiction in status cases do not offend a defendant's due process rights, even absent mini-
mum contacts. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Leonard, 122 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 903, 908 (1981) (jurisdiction over absent parent not required for modifying child cus-
tody determination); In re Marriage of Hudson, - Ind. App. - , 434 N.E.2d 107, 119
(1982) (in personam jurisdiction over absent spouse not required in a child custody action),
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After Shaffer, Rush, and Ireland, the "res" and "forum state
interest" justifications for casual jurisdiction in divorce cases sim-
ply will not suffice. If decisions like Williams I and Mullane0o
blurred the in rem-in personam distinction, Shaffer obliterated
it210 Further, Rush2 11 and Ireland12 confirmed the suggestion in
Shaffer2 3 and Kulko214 that even a strong forum state interest in
adjudicating will not justify an exercise of jurisdiction unfair to the
defendant. Rather, assertions of personal jurisdiction must satisfy
the contacts tests or, as this Article contends, the broader Interna-
tional Shoe standards of fairness as denoted by expectation and
benefit. Although Shaffer excepted from its contacts prescription
cases involving status and jurisdiction by necessity, the Court did
not explain why those categories qualified as independent jurisdic-
tional bases.
A footnote in Shaffer215 does provide a clue to the persistent
exception of status adjudications from the Court's general insis-
tence on defendant-forum contacts. Citing an article by Justice
Traynor,s1 6 the Court seemed to hint that in divorce actions, unlike
most civil proceedings, the plaintiff's due process interest is one of
personal liberty, and that the defendant's interest in opposing that
liberty deserves little protection.2 7 In other words, the Court
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1187 (1983); In re Marriage of Rinderknecht, 174 Ind. App. 382, 388,
367 N.E.2d 1128, 1133 (1977) (in-state residence of one spouse sufficient basis for divorce
jurisdiction); Carr v. Carr, 46 N.Y.2d 270, 273 n.1, 413 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 n.1, 385 N.E.2d
1234, 1236 n.1 (1978) (court has little doubt that status-based jurisdiction survives Shaffer);
In re M.S.B., 611 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (mother's residence in Texas suffi-
cient basis of jurisdiction over father in custody action).
209. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
210. See 433 U.S. at 212.
211. See 444 U.S. at 332-33.
212. See 456 U.S. at 703.
213. See 433 U.S. at 209-10.
214. See 436 U.S. at 96-97.
215. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
216. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tax. L. REV. 657 (1959). Justice
Traynor noted that "divorce proceedings are not for the most part adversary except in
name. In any event, a defendant's purposeless interest in barricading the plaintiff's avenue
to freedom is overwhelmingly outweighed by the plaintiff's purposeful interest in securing
freedom." Id. at 661.
217. Shaffer's implicit concern for a divorce plaintiff's liberty interest and the wide-
spread acceptance in succeeding years of "no fault" divorce suggest that there is even more
reason now than when Williams I was decided for easing jurisdictional requirements in
cases of divorce. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process prohibits
states from conditioning access to judicial process on payment of filing fees by indigents).
The relaxed jurisdictional standards for divorce may be inconsistent with the Court's more
stringent requirements for child custody jurisdiction. Professor Casad, for example, notes
that in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), the Court required personal jurisdiction over the
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seemed to distinguish the defendant's low level interest in oppos-
ing the divorce plaintiff's bid for liberty from his greater interest in
resisting the same plaintiff's claims to marital property. The Court
imposes the ordinary requirements for personal jurisdiction over
the defendant in suits for alimony,218 property distribution,219 and
child support.220 Perhaps this limited reach of divorce jurisdiction
founded solely on the plaintiff's domicile makes it more palatable.
The proposed expectations analysis may justify the Williams I
result-effective approval of divorce jurisdiction in the state of
domicile of either spouse-without reference to the contacts tests.
If each spouse continues to reside in the state of the marital domi-
cile, that is, where the couple last resided together, probably2 1 in
only that state Would either spouse expect the other to file for di-
vorce. If one spouse remains in the marital domicile and the other
leaves it, initially each spouse would continue to expect that any
divorce suit filed would be only in the state of marital domicile. As
time passes, however, it becomes fairer to impute to each spouse
the realistic expectation that the absent spouse might sue for di-
defendant as a prerequisite to granting full faith and credit to a divorce decree that in-
cluded an order of support, alimony, and division of property. Later, as Professor Casad
observes, the Court, relying on Estin, required a similar, standard basis of personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant as a prerequisite to an award of child custody, reasoning that the
right to custody was "far more precious than the property rights involved in Estin and
therefore. . . entitled to similar jurisdictional protection." Professor Casad argues that the
divorce defendant, too, "might well regard his or her marriage as 'far more precious' than
property." R. CASAD, supra note 172, at 9-27. He concludes that the Court should no more
have insisted on a strict basis of jurisdiction over the defendant in the custody situation
than in the divorce setting, in which Williams I relaxed jurisdictional requirements. Id.
while the argument that the defendant may have a liberty interest in preserving the
marital status is appealing, it does not cast doubt on the relaxed form of jurisdiction ap-
proved in Williams I for cases limited to divorce. The Court justified the more lenient di-
vorce jurisdiction approved by Williams I in part by the "interest that the state in which a
spouse is domiciled has in the marital status of that spouse." The more usual interest of the
forum state, though, even when that is the state of the plaintiff's domicile, would be to
support the institution of marriage rather than to facilitate its dissolution-and therefore to
deny divorce jurisdiction. Courts, however, have recognized that the relevant public policy is
to favor not any marriages but good marriages, and particularly to provide a supportive'
family environment for children. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. at 2991. At any
rate, governmental interests-whether in support of or in opposition to the institution of
marriage-are no longer adequate justification for upholding or rejecting personal jurisdic-
tion. See supra text accompanying notes 17-34. This Article considers child custody more
fully infra section L
218. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
219. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. at 416.
220. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
221. Conceivably, a state other than the one of marital domicile could exercise juris-
diction over one spouse under the Perkins analysis if that spouse had sufficient regular con-
tacts with that state.
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vorce in the state of his or her newly-acquired technical domicile
or settled residence.222 This expectations approach treats marriage
as consisting of three separate statuses-the status of each spouse
and the status of their joint relation-because each of these sta-
tuses is inextricably bound up in the formation, maintenance, and
dissolution of a marriage.
L Child Custody
The commentary and opinions about jurisdiction in child cus-
tody disputes are rife with confusing, often conflicting theories. In
the leading case, May v. Anderson,2 3 the Supreme Court described
a parent's interest in child custody as embracing rights "far more
precious" than property rights224 and thus as deserving "at least as
much protection as [a spouse's] right to alimony."22 5 Because the
Court previously had ruled that orders settling money disputes did
not warrant full faith and credit unless the rendering court had a
traditional basis of personal jurisdiction over the defendant,226 it
held in May that the forum state must have a similar basis of ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant parent in order to adjudi-
cate that parent's right to the custody of a child.
22 7
Professor Hazard aptly described the result in May as a "pre-
amble to family law chaos. '228 The decision produced an immedi-
ate incongruity in doctrine and eventually created serious practical
problems in regulating the family environment of the nation's chil-
dren.229 The doctrinal confusion stems from the Court's conclusion
that a parent's rights to child custody should enjoy the same pro-
tection as his rights to property. This conclusion, however, seems
inconsistent with Williams 1,23° in which the Court did not insist
222. In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) (Williams II), the Court em-
phasized the importance of the requirement that the plaintiff be legitimately domiciled in
the forum in accordance with the forum state's rules governing the length of residence re-
quired to achieve domicile status. Under the analysis proposed in this Article, a state-de-
fined period for acquiring a new domicile would meet due process standards for divorce
jurisdiction only if the court could determine that the period was long enough to cause a
shift of the defendant's (imputed) expectation about place of suit.
223. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
224. Id. at 533.
225. Id. at 534.
226. Estin, 334 U.S. at 541.
227. 345 U.S. at 534.
228. Hazard, May v. Anderson: Preamble to Family Law Chaos, 45 VA. L. Rov. 379
(1959).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 235-38.
230. Williams I, 317 U.S. at 287; see supra notes 205-17 and accompanying text.
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on a traditional basis of personal jurisdiction over a divorce de-
fendant, but instead treated divorce-despite the personal nature
of the interests concerned-as a status exception to standard juris-
dictional requirements. May, then, sharply raises the question why
a parent's interest in a child custody dispute warrants greater ju-
risdictional protection than a divorce defendant's interest in re-
maining married. 3 1 The May Court could have recognized a status
exception to jurisdiction for child custody that paralleled the Wil-
liams I status exception for divorce. The rationale for the Williams
I status exception, however-forum state interest 23 2-may no
longer offer defensible support for a status exception to the re-
quirements of personal jurisdiction. 83 Moreover, even if the Court
were to reconcile May and Williams by overruling May and re-
laxing jurisdictional restrictions for custody litigation, another doc-
trinal incongruity would result. Because the Court recently has
held ' that due process requires a traditional basis of personal ju-
risdiction over a defendant parent in a child support action, any
loosening of the May restrictions on custody jurisdiction would
suggest that the Court places a higher value on the parent's inter-
est in his property than on his interest in his child.
23 5
Notwithstanding the interest of parents, the well-being of chil-
dren-the real focus of custody litigation-demands the rejection
of May's traditional rule. May has so severely impeded the orderly
determination of child custody disputes that an urgent need exists
for a sound theoretical ground for overruling that decision and for
applying Shaffer's status exception in the child custody context.3 6
Paradoxically, the unrealistic rigors of the May rule have caused
most courts simply to ignore May by limiting it to the realm of full
231. One answer today is that the defendant in a divorce proceeding has only a slight
interest because, even if present, he would be unable to prevent the divorce. At the time of
Williams I and May, however, no-fault divorce was generally unavailable, and defendants
could still resist divorce petitions by rebutting the plaintiff's "grounds" or by relying on
doctrines-like "recrimination"--that constituted affirmative defenses to the plaintiff's
claim. See Orfield, Divorce for Temperamental Incompatibility, 52 MICH. L. REv. 659, 661-
62 (1953).
232. See Williams I, 317 U.S. at 298; see also Comment, supra note 114, at 867.
233. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 114, at 868; supra note 18 and text accompanying
notes 23-25.
234. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 84.
235. Comment, supra note 114, at 869.
236. Some commentators have proposed grounds for applying the status exception in
child custody cases. See Bodenheimer & Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction Over Child Custody
and Adoption After Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C.D. L. Rlv. 229, 240 (1979); Developments in
the Law, The Constitution and The Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1246 (1980).
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faith and credit as opposed to due process. Accordingly, these
courts find, based on the state's interest in children's welfare, that
"personal jurisdiction over an absent parent is not indispensable to
[original] custody jurisdiction, even if it may be indispensable to
interstate recognition. ' 23 7 These decisions, coupled with the sus-
ceptibility of custody decrees to repeated modification in other
states, "have combined to produce a climate that encourages child
snatching and repetitive interstate custody contests.
'23 8
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),5 9
drafted to curb the multistate litigation problems associated with
child custody claims, offers one solution. The UCCJA's prerequi-
sites to suit address subject matter more than they address per-
sonal jurisdiction; the Act itself contains no provision for extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction in custody cases, 240  and its relaxed
"jurisdictional" requirements potentially conflict with the Supreme
Court's decision in May. The Act's general and most stringent re-
quirement is that before a state court may determine custody, the
child who is the subject of the proceeding must have "lived with
his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six
consecutive months" in the forum state prior to the commence-
ment of the custody proceeding.241 This provision clearly implies
that, unlike May, the Act does not require personal jurisdiction
over defendant parents claiming an interest in the child's cus-
tody.242 By 1981, forty-seven states had adopted the Act.243 In
237. R. CAsAD, supra note 172, at 9-27. In Kulko the Supreme Court implicitly may
have acquiesced in this attempt to limit May to a rule about full faith and credit. As Profes-
sor Casad observes, the claim for child support payments in that case was joined by a claim
seeking modification of the custody award, and the Supreme Court, despite the objection of
the nonresident defendant father, did not question California's jurisdiction to order a cus-
tody change. Id. at 9-27 to 9-28.
238. Id. at 9-28.
239. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as U.C.C.J.A.].
240. U.C.C.J.A. § 12 commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 150; R. CASAD, supra note 172, at
9-31; Comment, supra note 114, at 864-66.
241. U.C.C.J.A. §§ 2(5), 3(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 119, 122.
242. R. CASAD, supra note 172, at 9-31. The Commissioners noted that they had im-
posed "no requirement for technical personal jurisdiction, on the traditional theory that
custody determinations, as distinguished from support actions.., are proceedings in rem
or proceedings affecting status." U.C.C.J.A. § 12 commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 150. The
Commissioners argued that jurisdiction based solely on the forum's becoming the "home
state" of the child is "not at variance with May v. Anderson... , which relates to inter-
state recognition rather than in-state validity of custody decrees." Id. (citation omitted).
Their prefatory sentence to the note, however, contradicts this justification. That sentence
states that § 12 (which declares binding the effect of a custody decree based solely on the
child's forum contacts rendered under § 3, see supra note 241), "deals with the intra-state
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1980, Congress in effect federalized the UCCJA by requiring that
each state give full faith and credit to the child custody decisions
of other states whenever "jurisdictional" considerations modeled
after the UCCJA support the rendering state's decision.
244
Because the status exception is only a thinly disguised version
of the withering forum state interest doctrine, a supporting ration-
ale for the UCCJA's single factor approach of basing jurisdiction
on the child's residence should rely instead on the broader fairness
standards of International Shoe. None of the contacts tests, how-
ever, even as modified in part III, supports this approach. 45 Like-
wise, an analysis that bypasses contacts and focuses directly upon
the fairness criterion of benefit also fails to justify the UCCJA ap-
proach. Although the Kulko Court conceded that some financial
benefit may accrue indirectly to a nonresident parent from a
child's absence,46 the Court also observed that the parent would
receive comparable benefits from any state to which the child had
validity of custody decrees which provides the basis for their interstate recognition and
enforcement." Id. at 149-50 (emphasis added). If intrastate personal jurisdiction is the "ba-
sis for" interstate recognition, however, the requirements for intrastate jurisdiction should
be faithful to the requirements for interstate recognition enunciated in May.
243. Comment, supra note 114, at 862 & n.10.
244. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
245. For example, consider the contacts modification proposed in part III that would
recognize the defendant's forum contacts made after the events that generated the claim.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-24. Assume that the plaintiff mother removed the
child from the state of marital domicile to New York, and later files a child custody action
in New York, her new state of domicile as well as the child's. The nonresident defendant
father files an answer in which he objects that the forum lacks a basis of personal jurisdic-
tion. The contacts modification would inquire whether the defendant, by contesting jurisdic-
tion, has made a purposeful forum contact. The attempted analogy in this case would be to
the situation in which the nonresident defendant, by objecting to the forum's jurisdiction in
an "in rem" action concerning claims to forum property, supposedly acknowledges his con-
nection with the forum.
The analogy, however, fails. In the instance of the defendant property owner, the de-
fendant purposefully made his forum contact-his purchase or subsequent maintenance of
the property-prior to the onset of litigation; his objection to jurisdiction is significant only
because it constitutes an acknowledgement of that forum contact. In contrast, in the child
custody hypothetical, because the child came to the forum without the active agency or tacit
approval of the defendant, the defendant will have had no constitutionally adequate forum
contact at any time. Cf. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94 (denying jurisdiction despite defendant's
"acquiescence" in child's move). To subject the defendant to jurisdiction on the theory that
he made a forum contact merely by objecting to jurisdiction would be a reversion to the
justly criticized procedure enforced for many years in Texas. That procedure withstood con-
stitutional attack, see York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890), but since then every state has
repudiated it. R. FmrLD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 184, at 730.
246. 436 U.S. at 95.
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moved.247
This Article's proposed bypass analysis geared to the defend-
ant's expectations provides a sounder theoretical justification for
jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Just as Shaffer seemed to approve
a relaxed form of divorce jurisdiction by assigning primary impor-
tance to the plaintiff's liberty interest,2 4 the analysis here should
begin by identifying the welfare of the child as the primary inter-
est at stake in a child custody proceeding. 249 Recognition of the
child's interest as preeminent is critical because it allows courts to
impute to the warring spouses a reasonable expectation that a cus-
tody adjudication might take place in a state having access to the
most recent relevant information concerning the child's welfare
and having the immediate ability to enforce the custody
determination.
The expectations of the custody combatants, like the expecta-
tions of divorce litigants, may change over time, and appropriately
the UCCJA reflects those changes. For example, assume that a
married couple with a child lives together in California. One spouse
leaves the martial domicile and, without the other spouse's knowl-
edge, removes the child to Illinois. If the deserted spouse desires to
regain custody of the child, he or she immediately could file a cus-
tody suit in California; in contrast, the fleeing spouse ordinarily
could file suit in Illinois only after the expiration of the UCCJA's
six month waiting period. California seems a fair forum for the
custody determination in this hypothetical because the absent
spouse certainly should expect that the litigation might take place
there. California is not only the most recent family domicile-and
therefore the state with which the absent defendant has had multi-
ple claim-related contacts-but also the forum with the most re-
cent and substantial information relevant to the child's welfare. If,
however, the deserted spouse fails to file an action in California,
and the Illinois spouse, more than six months after fleeing, files for
a custody determination in Illinois, Illinois should be able to enter
a binding custody decree. Six months after the child's departure
247. Id. at 95-96.
248. 433 U.S. at 208 n.30; see supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
249. That the welfare of the child, rather than an interest of the parent, is paramount
in child custody proceedings is universally agreed. See U.C.C.J.A. prefatory note, 9 U.L.A.
114. In Pennoyer's terms, the child is the very "object of the action." 95 U.S. at 727. In 1983
the Court reaffirmed that parental rights depend somewhat on the fulfillment of parental
duties, owing to the "paramount interest in the welfare of children." Lehr v. Robertson, 103




the California spouse reasonably should expect that a custody de-
termination might take place in the state of the child's new home,
since that state would have the most recent relevant information.
Thus, expectation bypass analysis offers a rationale consistent with
standards of fairness to the defendant for the practical necessity to
overrule May and uphold the UCCJA scheme. This approach
seems preferable to an unreasoned reliance upon the historical
"status" exception or the discredited forum state interest doctrine.
J. Personal Service Within the Forum
Ever since Pennoyer,2 5 0 "tagging," the in-forum service of pro-
cess on a nonresident, has been a sufficient jurisdictional basis to
require a nonresident to defend any claim in that state.251 Even
though state courts have the discretion not to exercise available
jurisdiction,5 2 most courts continue to accept jurisdiction based on
"tagging" without reference to the defendant's forum contacts253 or
to other measures of the forum's fairness. The traditional rationale
for this single factor basis of jurisdiction is that each state, al-
though part of a union, retains certain attributes of sovereignty,2"
and inherent in a state's sovereignty is the power to exercise juris-
diction over all persons served with process within its borders.255
"Tagging," however, is in jeopardy after International Shoe's
reformulation of personal jurisdiction standards in terms of the de-
fendant's forum contacts and Shaffer's flat rejection of quasi in
rem jurisdiction as a single factor basis of jurisdiction.256 The ex-
tensive commentary2 57 that Shaffer's frontal attack on Pennoyer's
250. 95 U.S. at 733.
251. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 (1971). The classic example
appears in Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959), which upheld Arkansas'
jurisdiction solely on the basis of service on the defendant during an airplane flight in that
state's airspace.
252. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 440; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 83-84
(1971); Lewis, supra note 13, at notes 406-09 and accompanying text. The recognition that a
state court may construe the forum state's jurisdictional statutes narrowly so as to stay
short of the reach allowable under the due process clause appears to underlie the decision of
the Supreme Court of Texas in Hall v. Helicopteras Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., 638
S.W.2d 870, 877-81 (1982) (Pope, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983).
253. See Vernon, supra note 57, at 302.
254. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
255. Id.
256. 433 U.S. at 209. But see Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22
(1980) (upholding "tagging" because the holding in Shaffer did not specifically condemn
that basis of jurisdiction).
257. See, e.g., Bernstine, Shaffer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule
of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VIL. L. REv. 38 (1979); Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Su-
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"power theory" of jurisdiction has generated is virtually unani-
mous in its opposition to the notion that in-state service of process
on a transient nonresident defendant should confer jurisdiction. 58
These commentators maintain that retaining "tagging" as a juris-
dictional basis often would permit courts to assert jurisdiction in-
consistently with the contacts approach that they interpret Shaffer
to mandate. 59 Because this Article is in complete accord with this
conclusion, it will only briefly discuss the fate of "tagging" under
its proposed minimum contacts modifications and uniform fairness
criteria.
If the claim is unrelated to the defendant's activity in the fo-
rum and if that activity is not extensive, "tagging" would not be
fair to the defendant under a traditional minimum contacts analy-
sis.260 Moreover, none of the modifications of the contacts tests
proposed in part III would offer any more support for the "tag-
ging" jurisdictional basis.261 Nor would the proposed expectation
bypass analysis tend to uphold this assertion of jurisdiction, since
a court should not assume that a person's mere physical presence
in a state generates an expectation of suit there on a claim unre-
lated to forum activity.262 Finally, mere presence in a state confers
no benefit to the defendant that he did not already have by virtue
of the privileges and immunities clause or the judicially enunciated
right to interstate travel.2 6 3 Therefore, without a traditional or
preme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739 (1977);
Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L.
REv. 505 (1978); Posnak, supra note 47; Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law:
The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978); Vernon, supra note 57; Vernon,
State-Court Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63
IOWA L. REv. 997 (1978); Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
15 (1978).
258. Posnak, supra note 47, at 744.
259. See, e.g., Bernstine, supra note 257, at 54; Posnak, supra note 47, at 738-39;
Vernon, supra note 57, at 303.
260. Neither claim-related contacts of the McGee type nor a quantum of contacts ade-
quate to meet the requirements of Perkins would exist.
261. Service within the state is unrelated to the plaintiff's need for forum jurisdiction,
the defendant's purposeful contacts taking place after the events triggering the litigation,
the degree of the defendant's need to appear, or the significance of a blending of contacts.
262. Justice Stevens' remark that "[i]f I visit another State.. . I knowingly assume
some risk that the State will exercise its power over... my person while there," Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. at 218 (concurring opinion), is not necessarily to the contrary. A look at
the context reveals that Justice Stevens offered this comment as an example of a situation
in which a nonresident's "particular activity," not mere presence, may subject him to forum
jurisdiction. See id.
263. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919) (affirmed constitutional right of a non-
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modified contacts measure of fairness or a link to benefits or ex-
pectations about place of suit, courts should discard the single fac-
tor jurisdictional basis of "tagging."
K. Jurisdiction by Necessity
Under the name of jurisdiction by necessity8 4 some courts
have eased jurisdictional restrictions when the plaintiff has no
other available forum. Mullane 265 is the one decision in which the
Court appeared to rely on jurisdiction by necessity as its principal
ground of decision. 68 Pursuant to New York statutes, trustees of
113 participating trusts with beneficiaries residing in various states
deposited the assets of those trusts into a common fund under the
care of a common trustee, the plaintiff bank. The implementing
statutes required the bank, as trustee, to bring an action for judi-
cial settlement of its accounts within twelve to fifteen months after
the establishment of the common trust and to publish a notice of
that action in a designated newspaper once weekly for four weeks.
The statutory procedure also required the appointment of two
guardians: one for the beneficiaries with an interest in the trust
income, and one for the beneficiaries with an interest in the trust
principal.2 6 An analysis of Mullane reveals that the New York
court had no traditional independent basis of jurisdiction.2 68 First,
traditional in personam jurisdiction was not possible because the
nonresident beneficiaries did not receive personal service in the fo-
rum2 69 and, as far as the opinion reveals, had no purposeful 270 con-
resident individual to enter into another state to do business); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (recognized constitutional right to interstate travel).
264. See Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U.
PA. L. Rzv. 305 (1951).
265. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
266. Although the Court has not applied the jurisdiction by necessity approach since
Mullane, neither has it closed the door to continued use of the doctrine. In Shaffer, for
example, the Court confronted a version of this argument; the plaintiffs in Shaffer argued
that the Court should preserve in rem jurisdiction to assure plaintiffs a forum. 433 U.S. at
211. The Court did not consider this "necessity" issue to be present on Shaffer's facts, id. at
211 n.37, probably because the defendants were amenable to suit in other American states,
even though no one state likely could have secured jurisdiction over all of them. See infra
note 282. The Court reassured plaintiffs "that the fairness standards of International Shoe"
easily would justify jurisdiction in "the vast majority of cases." Id. at 211.
267. 339 U.S. at 307-10; see Fraser, supra note 264, at 308.
268. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 264 at 310.
269. Id. at 308.
270. Some writers have argued that the Mullane result can "fit squarely within the
minimum contacts analysis." Brilmayer, supra note 53, at 108; Note, Uniform Approach,
supra note 47, at 141 n.63. This position apparently assumes that the trust beneficiaries
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tacts with New York. Second, jurisdiction in rem failed because
the action was to settle the trustee's personal obligation rather
than to affect title to the trust assets.27 1 Despite this lack of any
accepted basis of jurisdiction, the Court held that the state court
had the power to settle the trustee's account and to render a liabil-
ity determination that would bind the absent beneficiaries. The
Court rested its decision solely upon the forum state's "vital inter-
est.... . in bringing any issues concerning its fiduciaries to a final
settlement. '27 2 Thus, the Court in Mullane ignored the Interna-
tional Shoe defendant-fairness standards that Shaffer later pro-
claimed should govern "all" assertions of personal jurisdiction.
Because the beneficiaries' property rights were at risk,273 but
jurisdiction could not rest on ordinary contacts factors, the Mul-
lane decision to uphold jurisdiction is justifiable, if at all, only
under broader standards of fairness. By those standards the Mul-
lane result seems fair. First, in view of the many trusts and benefi-
ciaries scattered among different states, New York was "the only
adequate forum available to the plaintiff. 2 4 While the bank could
"have benefited from the protection of the laws of the forum in which the trust is located
and have purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in the
state." Note, Uniform Approach, supra note 47, at 141 n.63. The beneficiaries' sole forum
contact, however, the presence in the forum of trust assets in which they had an interest,
was the result of an act by the settlor, perhaps even without the beneficiaries' knowledge.
The only relevant activity of the beneficiaries was their "receipt of royalties or income." Id.
That the Court today would recognize the receipt of this benefit as purposeful activity suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of Hanson seems unlikely. The Mullane defendants' re-
ceipt of benefits is precisely the kind of nonpurposeful contact consummated through the
unilateral act of a third party that the Court has declared deficient in Hanson, see 357 U.S.
at 253, and World-Wide, see 444 U.S. at 298.
This author once wrote that claim-related contacts might rationalize jurisdiction in
Mullane; such a view entailed treating any beneficiaries' objections to New York's jurisdic-
tion as purposeful New York contacts that effectively ratified the forum contact which the
settlor previously had established for them. See Lewis, supra note 13, at 789 n.103. While
this view has the virtue of recognizing the possibility that jurisdictionally significant con-
tacts might follow the commencement of an action, it is ultimately unsound because it erro-
neously assumes that the beneficiaries themselves had made voluntary, purposeful forum
contacts. Assigning jurisdictional significance to their objections to jurisdiction would be
unfair. See supra note 245 (discussing the same analytical flaw in the child custody
context).
271. Fraser, supra note 264, at 308-09.
272. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313; see World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 310 n.17 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Lewis, supra note 13, at 787; Ratner & Schwartz, supra note 144, at 649 n.47;
Developments in the Law, State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 203, at 961-62.
273. The beneficiaries' property interests were subject to diminution by the allowance
of fees or expenses to the trustee. The court's decree also might have terminated their rights
to have the trustee answer for mismanagement of their interests. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313.
274. Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over Foreigners, 12 CORULL INV'L L.J. 67, 73
(1979). In fact, "jurisdiction ...over all the beneficiaries could not be obtained in any
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have instituted separate actions in as many states as necessary to
subject each of the beneficiaries to jurisdiction, -5 this costly frag-
mentation would have defeated one of the primary purposes of
common trusts-economies of management through the sharing of
expenses. e Moreover, requiring duplicative law suits arguably
would have deprived the plaintiff bank of property in the form of
excess litigation costs, without due process.2 7 7 Second, each benefi-
ciary in Mullane had a lesser than usual need to appear and to
defend because of the substantial identity of interest among the
members of each beneficiary class and the appearance of at least
one defendant from each subclass.278 Last, once these beneficiaries
became aware279 of their interests in the common trust fund, it
seems perfectly fair to have imputed to them an expectation that
any lawsuits concerning their interests might take place in the
state that regulated and protected the trust assets. In sum, a num-
ber of party-fairness factors justify the result in Mullane: the
plaintiff's unusually strong need for a single forum; the unusually
slight need of any particular defendant to appear in the action to
advance a position that a similarly situated defendant was likely to
assert; and the expectations of suit reasonably imputable to the
defendants once they learned of the action.
other state . . . ... Developments in the Law, State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 203, at
961.
275. Professor Fraser wrote that to settle the trustee's account, if ordinary personal
jurisdiction over each beneficiary were necessary, usually would be impossible since the trus-
tee could never acquire jurisdiction over all of them in any one place. Fraser, supra note
264, at 311. This view mistakenly equates strict impossibility with practical necessity, but
Professor Fraser nonetheless makes a potent practical observation.
276. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 308. It would have been uneconomical for the bank to pur-
sue separate judicial settlement actions in many states. Each participating trust in a Mul-
lane-type common fund contributes relatively small assets, id.; therefore it presumably gen-
erates relatively small fees to the trustee bank. Consequently, forcing separate actions in
several states might have amounted to "the equivalent of denying [the plaintiff trustees] an
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s]." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971)).
277. The Court recently has described Mullane as holding that "a cause of action is a
species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause." Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. at 428. The Court observed that the due process clauses
have long protected "civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as defendants
hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances." Id. at
429.
278. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309; Developments in the Law, State Court Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 203, at 961.
279. The beneficiaries may have gained this awareness either in advance when the
trust was established or through the published notice that the trustee gave upon commenc-
ing the action.
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In another case a court could rationalize jurisdiction by neces-
sity under the modified contacts approach alone-that is, even
without reference to the ultimate fairness criteria of expectation or
benefit. In Shaffer, for example, the Court almost surely would
have sustained jurisdiction under a "blending of contacts" ap-
proach. Although the Court acknowledged that the nonresident de-
fendant officers of the Delaware corporation had both claim-re-
lated and nonclaim-related forum contacts,80 their contacts were
insufficient to satisfy either polar contacts test independently.2 8 1
Under the "blending of contacts" approach, the Court could have
given substantial weight to the plaintiff's interest in avoiding frag-
mented litigation against numerous defendants in their several
home states28 2 and to the defendants' weak but palpable and ongo-
ing forum contacts. A combining of these factors might well have
yielded the conclusion that jurisdiction in Delaware was relatively
fair to the parties. This result would have eased the "difficult and,
at times, impossible task" that plaintiffs sometimes face, after
Shaffer, in seeking a single forum for asserting claims against mul-
tiple defendants.28 3
Ironically, however, the limited plaintiff's interest developed
in this Article probably should not support jurisdiction in an
American court if the only alternative forum is a court of a foreign
nation-even though those circumstances give rise to at least as
strong a necessity argument as those present in Shaffer. For exam-
ple, assume that a plaintiff seeking to sue a single defendant has
only one forum in the United States that might satisfy even the
most diluted fairness standard, but that a foreign court would be
willing to decide the case. Although one decision upholds the
American court's jurisdiction in this situation on a "necessity" ra-
tionale,284 the revised contacts approach actually may indicate a
280. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47.
281. 433 U.S. at 213. Because the defendants' conduct at issue took place in Oregon,
the majority concluded that the plaintiff's claim was not sufficiently related to the defend-
ants' contacts with Delaware to support jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes
143-44. Further, the Court did not consider the benefits and protections that Delaware law
afforded to the defendants in their capacities as corporate fiduciaries sufficient to meet the
magnitude requirements of the Perkins test of substantial, systematic contacts. See supra
text accompanying notes 144-47 and 179.
282. This proposition assumes that no other state besides Delaware might have had
jurisdiction over all the defendants on another theory-for example, claim-relatedness. No
such alternative to the Delaware forum may have existed in Shaffer. See Fyr, supra note
257, at 771-73.
283. Vernon, supra note 57, at 314; see also supra text accompanying notes 126-36.
284. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 208 N.E.2d
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different result, in large part because concern about fragmentation
is irrelevant when there is only one defendant. A decision denying
jurisdiction on these facts might not be unfair since the foreign
nation's willingness to accept jurisdiction probably means that the
plaintiff had some contact with that country and arguably should
face the consequences of that contact. Of course, if the foreign na-
tion were to decline jurisdiction, the plaintiff would be remediless
unless the single American forum with a colorable claim to juris-
diction could exercise it. That plaintiff's interest is not in avoiding
fragmented litigation but rather is in securing at least one effective
forum to prosecute a civil claim. 285 Since a plaintiff is effectively
deprived of property if he is unable to proceed in any court, the
jurisdiction by necessity basis should be preserved for those few
instances in which the only available forum anywhere is an Ameri-
can court"' that lacks the ordinarily required contacts.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a unified theory of personal jurisdic-
tion based on a single jurisdictional goal-fairness to the par-
ties-and two uniform criteria for assessing fairness-the defend-
ant's expectations about place of suit and his forum-derived
benefit. The theory will have varying consequences for the tradi-
tional jurisdictional tests. It demands at least four modifications to
the traditional minimum contacts tests to make them consistent
with the criteria of expectation and benefit. The single factor, sat-
ellite jurisdictional tests not based on contacts will rise or fall on
their merits, depending on their compatibility with these fairness
criteria. Of the eleven satellite tests surveyed, only "tag-
ging"-personal service within the forum-is clearly inconsistent
with these criteria. Another, domicile, may require such extensive
redefinition before it can furnish a reliable prediction about expec-
tation and benefit that it may no longer be useful as a surrogate.
The other satellite tests, however, for the most part gain renewed
theoretical justification from their correlation with expectation and
439 (1965).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90, 108-09, 277.
286. In the absence of guidance from the Court, lower court decisions interpreting
Shaffer's apparent preservation of a necessity exception understandably differ on whether
"no other forum" means no other forum in the United States, see Louring v. Kuwait Boul-
der Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630, 633 (D. Conn. 1977), or anywhere in the world, see J.S.
Serv. Center Corp. v. Banco Continental, 103 Misc. 2d 325, 326, 425 N.Y.S.2d 945, 946
(1980).
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benefit.
The proposed unified theory has the potential to improve the
quality of personal jurisdiction decisions in several respects. Be-
cause it would make available to courts and litigants a range of
flexible jurisdictional tests adaptable to the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, the theory would promote increased objectivity and
efficiency in jurisdictional decision-making. The fairness criteria
would free judges from the confines of the contacts tests; at the
same time, they would furnish rational limitations for refinements
to all of the particularized tests of jurisdiction. In brief, judges
could maximize fairness to the parties by adhering to the constant,
uniform criteria of expectation and benefit in deciding questions of
personal jurisdiction.
